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I.   INTRODUCTION
In Pennsylvania, undercover police officers sell a new Sears vide o-
cassette recorder to a shopkeeper at a suspiciously low price. The
shopkeeper then repeatedly calls the security manager of the local
Sears store in an attempt to ascertain if the VCR had been stolen. The
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security manager, who provided the VCR to the police officers, a s-
sures the shopkeeper that it was not stolen but does not tell him of the
covert police operation. The shopkeeper then advises a uniformed p o-
lice officer that he suspects the VCR was stolen, but the officer merely
instructs him to stop harassing Sears employees. Thus reassured, the
shopkeeper makes several other purchases from the undercover police
officers. He is later indicted for conspiracy to receive stolen property.1
In Florida, an unemployed man is invited to rent a room in the
home of a police informant. When he falls behind in his rent pa y-
ments, the informant tells the man that he has friends in the Mafia
and that these friends would not put up with a moocher. The info r-
mant then kicks the man out, leaving him fearful, jobless, and hom e-
less. Police detectives, posing as the informant’s Mafia friends, then
approach the man and offer him a job and a place to live, but only on
the condition that he find them a supplier of cocaine. After some hes i-
tation, the man agrees and is subsequently arrested for conspiring to
engage in drug trafficking.2
On a summer night in Springfield, Missouri, two informants on
the police payroll, acting at the direction of the Springfield Police D e-
partment, break into a building and steal a safe. An undercover p o-
lice officer helps them load the safe into a van while a fourth man,
who does not know that it is a police operation, sits in a car one-half
block away and acts as a lookout. Six weeks later, only the lookout is
arrested. He is charged with burglary and conspiracy.3
Although police-induced criminal activity is relatively rare, the
issues of whether and how the judiciary should deal with it have en-
gendered a great deal of controversy for most of this century.4 In
1932, the U.S. Supreme Court responded to the controversy by rec-
ognizing the defense of entrapment.5 Since then, this defense has
been adopted in one form or another in almost every jurisdiction in
the United States.6 Its effect is to exculpate those who might not
have committed a crime but for the government’s involvement and
coercive efforts.7
Even though this judicially created defense has become a funda-
mental component of American jurisprudence over the past sixty-five
                                                                                                                   
1. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 654 A.2d 591, 592-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
2. See Robichaud v. State, 658 So. 2d 166, 167-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
3. See State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 268-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
4. See generally Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections of Six
Decades of Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses, in Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 829, 831-32 (1992) (historically tracing entrapment and related defenses, and sug-
gesting the addition of a notice requirement to the Federal rules).
5. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932).
6. See Christopher D. Moore, The Elusive Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 89
NW. U. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1995).
7. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441-42.
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years, its doctrinal underpinnings remain in dispute.8 As a conse-
quence, several different forms of the entrapment defense are em-
ployed around the country, and fundamental issues surrounding it
remain unresolved.9 For example, why should society exculpate those
committing crimes at the behest of the government, but not those
beguiled into criminal activity by someone else? Is it appropriate for
the judiciary to scrutinize the law enforcement activities of the ex-
ecutive branch? Is the purpose of the defense to deter police miscon-
duct or is it to protect innocent defendants?
Based on different answers to these unresolved questions, the
judiciary has developed two basic forms of the entrapment defense.
Although both forms share a common goal—to determine whether
the government’s involvement is the principal cause of the crime—
the foci of the two inquiries differ.10 The objective form of the en-
trapment defense emphasizes the nature of the government’s ac-
tions, while the subjective form focuses on the defendant’s state of
mind.11
A minority of the Supreme Court Justices, along with a minority
of the states and the American Law Institute, have concluded that
an entrapment defense should be founded in the public policy ra-
tionales of deterring police misconduct and preserving the integrity
of the judicial process.12 Based on this conclusion, they argue for the
adoption of the objective approach, in which the conduct of the gov-
ernment actor, rather than the defendant’s predisposition or culpa-
bility, is the principal focus of the inquiry into whether the govern-
ment inducement caused the crime.13 If the government engaged in
conduct that was illegal or inappropriate, then a court applying the
objective standard may find that the defendant was entrapped re-
gardless of other considerations.14
The charges against the Pennsylvania shopkeeper, for example,
were dismissed after the trial court applied the objective approach.15
                                                                                                                   
8. See generally Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of
the Entrapment Defense, 73 VA. L. REV. 1011 (1987) (detailing the legal foundations of en-
trapment and arguing that the entrapment defense is a reactive situation to government
encouragement of crime).
9. See id. at 1014-21.
10. See id. at 1014.
11. See id. at 1014-17.
12. See, e.g., Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454 (Roberts, J., concurring); MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.13 cmt. 1 (1985).
13. See PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 81, 105-07 (2d ed. 1995). Under
the objective approach, the entrapment defense would be a nonexculpatory defense; that
is, a defense that arises only when an important public policy is realized by foregoing the
otherwise guilty defendant’s punishment. See 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
DEFENSES 460 (1984).
14. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 835-36.
15. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 654 A.2d 591, 593 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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The dismissal was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court af-
ter it concluded that the actions of the police were inappropriate be-
cause they were clearly designed to induce the shopkeeper into be-
lieving that his purchases were not unlawful.16
In contrast, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices have always
favored the subjective approach to entrapment. According to this
view, entrapment is a defense founded in legislative intent and the
concept of fundamental fairness to defendants.17 In Sorrells v. United
States,18 the case in which the Court first recognized entrapment as a
defense, the majority reasoned that it was contrary to established
principles of law to “punish a man for the commission of an offense of
the like of which he had never been guilty, either in thought or in
deed, and evidently never would have been guilty of if the officers of
the law had not . . . lured him to . . . commit it.”19 Pursuant to this
reasoning, the federal courts and most of the states have adopted the
subjective standard, in which the court examines the extent to which
the defendant was subjectively predisposed to commit the criminal
act prior to the government’s involvement.20
In the case of the Florida man charged with conspiracy to engage
in drug trafficking, the Florida district court applied the subjective
approach.21 Rather than examining the actions of the police and the
informant, the court reversed the man’s conviction solely because it
concluded that he was not disposed to engage in drug trafficking
prior to his contact with the undercover police officers.22
In recent years, to expand the protections afforded under the be-
leaguered and arguably underinclusive entrapment doctrine, some
jurisdictions have also recognized the due process-based exculpatory
defense of outrageous government conduct.23 The outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense is founded on the principle that when the
government’s conduct and involvement in a criminal venture is so
scandalous that a defendant is arguably deprived of due process of
                                                                                                                   
16. See id. at 594-95.
17. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52.
18. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
19. Id. at 444 (quoting Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921)).
20. See Moore, supra note 6, at 1160. Under this subjective approach, entrapment,
like duress, is an excuse defense because the defendant’s actions are not considered to
have been fully his own. See ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 513. In addition to the subjective
and objective standards, a few states have adopted hybrid approaches to entrapment that
are comprised of both objective and subjective elements. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at
44-47.
21. See Robichaud v. State, 658 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
22. See id.
23. See generally Donald A. Dripps, At the Borders of the Fourth Amendment: Why a
Real Due Process Test Should Replace Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 1993 U.
ILL. L. REV. 261, 265 (1993) (criticizing the outrageous government conduct defense as his-
torically unstable and at odds with selective incorporation).
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law, fundamental fairness prohibits prosecution of the resulting
crime.24 Because the defense is founded in the Constitution, it is doc-
trinally distinct from the various forms of entrapment. Nevertheless,
in practical application, there is some redundancy between the out-
rageous government conduct defense and the objective approach.25
For example, in the case of the lookout in Springfield who was
charged with burglary, the only statutory defense available to him
under Missouri law was the subjective approach to entrapment.26
Even though the court concluded that the defendant was predisposed
to commit the burglary, it nevertheless examined the actions of the
police officers and reversed his conviction on due process grounds be-
cause “[if] the government agents had not been there, doing their il-
legal acts, defendant’s conduct would not be illegal.”27
The federal courts of appeals have split over their recognition of
the outrageous government conduct defense, with some concluding
that it represents an erroneous attempt to expand the protections of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses.28 How-
ever, most of the circuits and many states have effectively developed
a dual approach to government-induced crimes in which they allow
defendants to invoke both the predisposition-based subjective en-
trapment defense and either the objective entrapment defense or,
more commonly, the outrageous government conduct defense.29
The principal purpose of this Article is to present a detailed de-
scription of the evolution and scope of each of these defenses, includ-
ing a critical analysis of their strengths and weaknesses. Based upon
this analysis, this Article concludes that the best means for balanc-
ing the rights of an induced defendant against the government’s
need to detect ongoing criminal activity is a dual system of defenses
in which the underinclusive subjective approach to entrapment is
augmented by one or both of the objective defenses. Part II is a de-
scription and critique of the subjective entrapment defense, includ-
                                                                                                                   
24. See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 1978).
25. Although the outrageous government conduct defense and the entrapment de-
fense both turn on the government’s involvement in a crime and its efforts to coerce an
unwitting person into participating, they are distinguishable as the former is grounded in
the Constitution and the latter is a creation of the judiciary. Because due process juris-
prudence demands a much higher degree of governmental coercion or misconduct, the
outrageous government conduct defense does not apply in all of the circumstances in
which a defendant might successfully invoke the entrapment defense. See Bennett, supra
note 4, at 855-59.
26. See State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 270 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
27. Id. at 274. Although the court reversed the defendant’s conviction for burglary, it
upheld his conviction for conspiracy since he had taken part in planning the crime. See id.
at 275-76.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1272 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
29. See infra Parts III, IV, V.
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ing a detailed summary of the evidentiary standards surrounding a
court’s inquiry into a defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime.
Part III is an analogous treatment of the objective entrapment de-
fense. Part IV presents a description and analysis of two hybrid
forms of the entrapment defense, the discrete and composite hybrid
approaches. Courts using these approaches, which have been
adopted in only a few states, incorporate both subjective and objec-
tive prongs into their entrapment analyses. Part V is an examination
and critique of the outrageous government conduct defense, includ-
ing its development, constitutional foundations, and practical appli-
cations. Incorporated into this discussion is an analysis of the cir-
cumstances in which courts are likely to conclude that the govern-
ment’s conduct has been “outrageous.”
II.   THE SUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO ENTRAPMENT
A.   Introduction: The Birth of the Entrapment Doctrine
Until the turn of the twentieth century, the judiciary staunchly
and almost universally rejected the notion that an inducement-based
exculpatory defense conferred any benefit on society. In 1864, for ex-
ample, the New York Supreme Court stated that the entrapment de-
fense “has never availed to shield crime or give indemnity to the cul-
prit, and it is safe to say that under any code of civilized, not to say
christian [sic] ethics, it never will.”30 Even as late as 1904, New
York’s Judge Vann vigorously rejected the entrapment defense in a
grand larceny case, stating that “[t]he courts do not look to see who
held out the bait, but to see who took it” and arguing that courts
“should not hesitate to punish the crime actually committed by the
defendant.”31
Notwithstanding Judge Vann’s admonishment, at about that time
courts began to recognize the need for a legal defense against in-
creasingly common police attempts to induce otherwise law-abiding
people into committing criminal acts.32 The most notable recognition
came in 1915, when the Ninth Circuit decided the case of Woo Wai v.
United States.33 In Woo Wai, undercover government immigration
officials spent several months attempting to persuade the reluctant
defendant, Woo Wai, to transport Chinese citizens into the United
                                                                                                                   
30. Board of Comm’rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (1864).
31. People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786, 791 (N.Y. 1904).
32. See John D. Lombardo, Causation and “Objective” Entrapment: Toward a Culpa-
bility-Centered Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 209, 219-20 (1995). See, e.g., People v. McCord,
42 N.W. 1106 (Mich. 1889) (setting aside a burglary conviction on the ground that a pri-
vate detective, who worked for the victim, had induced the defendant into committing the
burglary).
33. 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
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States across the Mexican border.34 When Woo Wai finally acceded,
officials arrested him for violating certain immigration laws.35 In re-
versing the lower court’s conviction, the Ninth Circuit found it de-
terminative that “the suggestion of the criminal act came from the
officers of the government,” rather than from the defendant.36 The
court based its decision in the public policy that government officials
should be dissuaded from encouraging individuals to commit crimes
they would not otherwise have committed.37
Seventeen years later, in Sorrells v. United States ,38 the U.S. Su-
preme Court recognized the validity of the entrapment defense.39 In
Sorrells, an undercover prohibition agent, accompanied by several of
the defendant’s friends, visited the defendant’s home.40 During the
visit, the agent repeatedly asked to purchase some liquor, but the de-
fendant responded that he “did not fool with whiskey.”41 By coinci-
dence, Sorrells and the agent had served in the same military unit
during World War I, and the conversation eventually turned to their
common war experiences.42 The agent then made yet another request
for liquor.43 This time, Sorrells left the house and returned with a
half-gallon of whiskey; he was later convicted of violating the Na-
tional Prohibition Act.44
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on the entrapment defense and reversed
Sorrell’s conviction.45 Although the Court’s decision to embrace the
entrapment doctrine was unanimous, the justices were divided over
its proper foundation and application. The majority and concurring
opinions exemplify the two competing approaches to the entrapment
doctrine.46
Both approaches require the defendant to prove that the govern-
ment actively induced her to commit the crime charged.47 However,
                                                                                                                   
34. See id. at 413.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 415.
37. See id.
38. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
39. See id. at 438-39. 
40. See id. at 439.
41. Id. at 440.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 439.
45. See id. at 438-39.
46. Compare id. at 435-52 (1932) (Hughes, C.J.) with id. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., con-
curring).
47. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 1014. The issue of inducement focuses on whether
the government conduct created a risk that an undisposed person might be persuaded to
commit the crime. It also requires some causal connection between the government’s con-
duct and the defendant’s commission of the offense. While this is a relatively easy stan-
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once she meets this burden of proof, the nature of the inquiry into
the two approaches diverges. This divergence stems from differences
in opinion over how to distinguish the government’s detection of on-
going criminal activity from a seduction of otherwise innocent per-
sons. The Sorrells majority focused on the predisposition of the ac-
cused to commit the crime,48 while Justice Roberts, who wrote the
concurring opinion, argued that the emphasis of the inquiry should
instead be on the conduct of the government agent in inducing the
criminal conduct.49 These competing approaches, which remain in
dispute even today, are the subject of the following sections.
B.   Subjective Entrapment: The Prevailing Theory
The gravamen of the subjective approach to entrapment is not the
amount of government participation, but rather the defendant’s
willingness to commit the crime.50 The Sorrells majority, which em-
braced this approach, concluded that a defendant with no criminal
predisposition falls outside the scope of the applicable criminal stat-
ute when she would not have committed a crime but for the govern-
ment’s enticement.51 Oddly, the majority founded its analysis in leg-
islative intent, reasoning that Congress could not have intended to
punish “person[s] otherwise innocent” for falling prey to a govern-
ment-created trap.52
Twenty-six years later, a majority of the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its subjective view of the entrapment doctrine in Sherman v.
United States.53 The case arose after a government informant met
the defendant, Sherman, in a doctor’s office, where both were receiv-
ing treatments for narcotics addiction.54 The informant feigned great
suffering from narcotics withdrawal and, over the course of several
months, repeatedly asked the defendant if he knew of a source for
the drugs.55 Sherman tried to avoid the issue, but eventually acqui-
esced and was later arrested for selling drugs to the informant.56 Al-
though the issue of entrapment went to the jury, Sherman was nev-
ertheless convicted.57
                                                                                                                   
dard for the defendant to meet, she must show that the government offered more than the
mere opportunity to commit a crime. See ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 519-20.
48. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 435-52.
49. See id. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., concurring).
50. See Moore, supra note 6, at 1160.
51. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52.
52. Id. at 451.
53. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
54. See id. at 371.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 372.
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The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the conviction, holding
that entrapment was established as a matter of law, but the justices
disagreed concerning the appropriateness of the subjective stan-
dard.58 Chief Justice Warren, who wrote the majority opinion, found
that the circumstances surrounding the informant’s repeated efforts
to persuade the defendant to obtain narcotics constituted induce-
ment.59 Invoking the subjective approach, he rejected the govern-
ment’s assertion that the defendant’s criminal record—a nine-year-
old drug sales conviction and a five-year-old possession conviction—
demonstrated a predisposition to commit the crime, particularly in
light of the fact that the defendant was trying to overcome his ad-
diction at the time of the inducement.60 Justice Frankfurter, joined
by three other justices, concurred in the result of the case but dis-
sented with respect to the majority’s use of the subjective approach.61
He argued that the Sorrells congressional intent justification for a
subjective approach was sheer fiction and that an objective approach
was necessary for the proper judicial supervision over governmental
abuses of power.62
Indeed, the Supreme Court has always been strongly divided over
the proper jurisprudence with respect to the entrapment doctrine.
The case of Hampton v. United States 63 perhaps best exemplifies this
division.64 In Hampton, the defendant, having observed needle
marks on the arm of a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant,
stated that he knew where to obtain some heroin.65 The informant
subsequently contacted the DEA and arranged for an agent to pur-
chase heroin from the defendant.66 Coincidentally, a second DEA
agent, who was posing as a narcotics dealer, was supplying the de-
fendant.67 After two separate sales were completed, the defendant
was arrested.68 Upon being convicted, he appealed the jury instruc-
tion on the ground that the government’s role in both supplying and
purchasing the heroin constituted entrapment.69
                                                                                                                   
58. See id. at 373.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 374.
61. See id. at 378-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The three justices joining Justice
Frankfurter were Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan.
62. See id. at 379-81.
63. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
64. A second issue raised in Hampton was the applicability under the circumstances
of the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. See id. at 489; infra notes 386-93
and accompanying text.




69. See id. at 487-88.
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In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, three jus-
tices looked only at the defendant’s predisposition, rather than the
government’s conduct, and found that there had been no entrap-
ment.70 Justice Rehnquist expressly reaffirmed the subjective
analysis, stating that the Court, in Sorrells and its progeny, had
“ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment could ever
be based upon governmental misconduct in a case . . . where the
predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime was estab-
lished.”71 In a concurring opinion, Justices Powell and Blackmun ac-
cepted the use of the subjective approach in this instance, but ex-
pressed strong reservations about the plurality’s view that police
over-involvement could never, under any circumstances, give rise to
an exculpatory defense.72 In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Stewart and Marshall, argued for the adoption of the objec-
tive analysis of entrapment and a reversal of the defendant’s convic-
tion on the ground that the DEA’s methods were unacceptable.73
The Supreme Court’s most recent examination of the entrapment
doctrine was set forth in the 1992 case of Jacobson v. United States .74
The United States Postal Inspection Service targeted the defendant,
Keith Jacobson, as a potential purchaser of child pornography after
his name was found on a mailing list from a California pornographic
bookstore.75 Over a period of twenty-six months, undercover postal
inspectors sent Jacobson two sexual attitude surveys, seven letters
asking him about his sexual preferences, and two sex catalogues, all
from fictitious persons and organizations.76 Eventually, the defen-
dant ordered a publication called “Boys Who Love Boys” and, follow-
ing delivery of the magazine, he was arrested for violating the Child
Protection Act of 1984.77 At trial, Jacobson testified that he was un-
sure of the magazine’s contents when he ordered it and that the gov-
ernment had merely succeeded in piquing his curiosity.78 He raised
the defense of entrapment, but was nevertheless found guilty.79
                                                                                                                   
70. See id. at 488-89.
71. Id. at 492.
72. See id. at 493 (Powell, J., concurring).
73. See id. at 496-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the alternative, Justice Brennan
argued that, even under the subjective approach, a defendant should not be considered
“predisposed” when the government actually supplied the contraband. See id. at 497-98.
74. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
75. See id. at 542-43. The defendant was a 56-year-old farmer in Nebraska. His name
was on the mailing list because he had previously ordered two “Bare Boys” magazines
from the bookstore. Those magazines, which contained photographs of nude preteen and
teenage boys, were not illegal at the time that Jacobson placed his order because the
young men depicted were not engaged in sexual activity. See id.
76. See id. at 543-46.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1997); see Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 547.
78. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 547.
79. See id. at 547-48. After trial, Jacobson’s case was appealed to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals twice. On the first appeal, an Eighth Circuit panel overturned the con-
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In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court overturned Jacob-
son’s conviction.80 Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded
that there was inadequate evidence to demonstrate that the defen-
dant was predisposed to violate the law by receiving child pornogra-
phy through the mail.81 The Court required the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant’s predisposition to
commit the crime was “independent of the Government’s acts.”82 Al-
though the prosecution attempted to meet this burden by showing
that Jacobson had previously ordered magazines from the California
bookstore, that action was not illegal at the time he placed the or-
der.83 The majority considered this legal purchase to be “scant if any
proof of [Jacobson’s] predisposition to commit an illegal act”84 and
concluded that the government had failed to meet its burden of proof
with respect to predisposition.85
Justice O’Connor, who wrote the dissenting opinion, argued that
the issue of entrapment was properly left for the jury and that a rea-
sonable juror could find that Jacobson was predisposed to commit
the crime.86 Furthermore, she maintained that the majority had im-
properly redefined “predisposition” to exclude any indication of the
defendant’s intent that comes to light after the government’s initial
contact with him, even if the government has not yet made any at-
tempt to induce the commission of a crime.87 Surprisingly, there was
no discussion of the objective approach to entrapment in Jacobson.
The Jacobson decision did not change the Court’s use of the sub-
jective standard in entrapment cases.88 However, the Court estab-
                                                                                                                   
viction, holding that the government must have reasonable suspicion of illegal activity be-
fore targeting an individual, and that Jacobson had been entrapped as a matter of law.
See United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, vacated, 899 F.2d 1549 (8th Cir. 1990). On
appeal by the government, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the panel’s finding
that the government’s actions constituted entrapment. See United States v. Jacobson, 916
F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev’d, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). See generally Damon D.
Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United States: Towards a More Balanced
Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1078-85 (1993) (suggesting
that Jacobson only added to the unworkable nature and unjust results engendered in the
entrapment defense); Amy Perkins, Jacobson v. United States—Entrapment Redefined?,
28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 847, 863-66 (1994) (examining entrapment generally and focusing on
the ambiguous effect of Jacobson on future cases).
80. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 547.
81. See id. at 554.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 550-51. Jacobson placed his order in February of 1984, but the Child
Protection Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2259 (1994)), which outlawed such mailings, was
not enacted until three months later. See id.
84. Id. at 550.
85. See id. at 554.
86. See id. at 554 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ken-
nedy, and Justice Scalia joined Justice O’Connor.
87. See id. at 556-57.
88. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 842.
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lished that the issue of a defendant’s predisposition is to be consid-
ered at the moment of the government’s first contact, rather than at
the moment the government induces the defendant to commit the
crime.89 Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently, if not unani-
mously, advocated the use of the subjective approach to entrapment.
In addition to the federal courts, about thirty-seven states have
followed the Supreme Court’s lead by incorporating a subjective in-
quiry into the entrapment defense, while only thirteen states have
adopted some form of objective entrapment.90
C.   The Nature of the Predisposition Inquiry
The first step in any entrapment inquiry is to determine whether
government inducement preceded and encouraged the act of which
the defendant is accused.91 A judicial finding of inducement, which is
usually a fairly easy burden for the defendant to meet, suggests that
there may be no justifiable reason, either retributive or preventative,
for society to punish the defendant.92 Since most jurisdictions apply
the subjective standard, the second, and pivotal, step in a majority of
entrapment cases is to determine whether the defendant was pre-
disposed to commit the offense charged.93
A predisposition inquiry focuses on when the defendant made the
decision to commit the criminal act, which hopefully will provide a
reliable indication of whether she made that decision of her own free
will.94 This, in turn, is presumed to be evidence of whether the de-
fendant poses a danger to society.95 If the defendant made the deci-
sion prior to the government’s inducement, then she is considered to
                                                                                                                   
89. See id.
90. See Scott C. Paton, “The Government Made Me Do It”: A Proposed Approach to
Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 1002 n.45 (1994).
While those states following the subjective approach have largely adopted it by judicial
decision, most states following the objective view have done so by statute. See MARCUS,
supra note 13, at 43.
91. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
92. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 1055-56. This is because a government-encouraged
act is not necessarily a convincing or reliable indicator that the defendant poses a threat
to society. See id.
93. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 126.
94. See id.
95. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 1071. The reasoning and presumptions here are ar-
guably weak. Simply because it did not occur to a defendant to commit a crime until a
government agent suggested it does not necessarily mean that she will be less dangerous
to society than someone who decided to commit the same offense at the suggestion of a
person not working for the government. Nevertheless, the former is exculpated while the
latter is held responsible for the offense. Thus, “the predisposition test alone cannot make
the distinction that subjectivists wish to make between defendants who are ready and
willing to commit crimes and those who are not.” Id. at 1040. Despite the test’s logical
weaknesses, its validity stems largely from the fact that it reflects a judicial attempt to
heed the notions of fundamental fairness and the presumption of innocence. See Sorrells
v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451-52 (1932).
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have had the requisite mens rea and is culpable for her criminal con-
duct.96 Conversely, if she made the decision to participate after the
government induced her to act, then the inducement is presumed to
have been the causal source of her decision and she is not held cul-
pable.97 The most compelling justification for this distinction is that
the principal purpose of a legal penalty is to protect society from
those who would harm it, not from those whose wrongful conduct
consists solely of a failure to exercise self-restraint in the face of gov-
ernment-generated temptation and encouragement.98
The Supreme Court conducted its first predisposition inquiry in
Sherman v. United States ,99 in which the defendant had been con-
victed of selling narcotics.100 Considering Sherman’s hesitancy and
the fact that he was seeking treatment for his narcotics addiction at
the time of the government’s inducement, the Court concluded that
his two previous narcotics convictions—one nine years previous and
the other five years previous—were not sufficient evidence of his
predisposition to sustain his conviction.101 Although the Court util-
ized a “totality of the circumstances” methodology, which remains
the standard approach for courts applying the subjective standard,
the Court never specifically defined predisposition.
In response, lower courts have attempted to provide some guid-
ance to lawyers and trial judges by devising a number of generalized
definitions for predisposition. The Supreme Court of Kansas, for ex-
ample, has stated that predisposition “connotes only a general intent
or purpose to commit the crime when an opportunity or facility is af-
forded for the commission thereof.”102 Similarly, the Second Circuit
has posited that “[i]t is sufficient if the defendant is of a frame of
mind such that once his attention is called to the criminal opportu-
nity, his decision to commit the crime is the product of his own pref-
erence and not the product of government persuasion.”103 The Sixth
Circuit has commented that a defendant must only show “a predis-
position to commit an offense.”104 Each of these descriptions suggests
that it is unnecessary for a predisposed defendant to have had an in-
tent to commit a specific crime at a specific time and place—a gen-
eral intent to commit a crime is sufficient.
                                                                                                                   
96. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 1071.
97. See id. at 1071-73.
98. See id. at 1063-64. However, this justification has its limits. The entrapment de-
fense is not available when the defendant is accused of a violent crime. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.13(3) (1985).
99. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
100. See id. at 375; supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
101. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375-76.
102. State v. Houpt, 504 P.2d 570, 574 (Kan. 1972) (emphasis added).
103. United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir. 1983).
104. United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244, 245 (6th Cir. 1977).
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However, definitions offered by other courts suggest that a pre-
disposed defendant must have had a specific intent to commit the
crime charged. The Tenth Circuit has defined predisposition as a
“defendant’s inclination to engage in the illegal activity for which he
has been charged, i.e. that he is ready and willing to commit the
crime.”105 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has stated that predisposi-
tion “refers to whether the defendant had a readiness or willingness
to commit the offenses charged.”106 In its most recent predisposition
inquiry, the Supreme Court in Jacobson commented that “the prose-
cution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached
by Government agents.”107 However, there was no discussion of the
general/specific intent dichotomy accompanying this remark, so it is
unclear whether the Court contemplated that it was making such a
distinction.108
Thus, while it is firmly established that a predisposition inquiry
should focus on “the defendant’s state of mind and inclinations be-
fore his initial exposure to the government agents,”109 it has never
been explicitly determined that specific intent is necessary to sup-
port a finding of predisposition. In practical application, however,
most courts require a fairly strong indication that the accused was
willing to engage in that particular crime. For example, with regard
to evidence of prior criminal acts, courts generally require that there
be a “substantial similarity” between the nature of the prior act and
the nature of the crime charged before they will admit that evidence
as bearing on whether the defendant was predisposed.110 Although
                                                                                                                   
105. United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986).
106. United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 1985).
107. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992) (emphasis added); supra
notes 74-90 and accompanying text (discussing Jacobson).
108. In Jacobson, the Court found that the defendant was not predisposed to engage
in any criminal activity. As a consequence, the Court was not compelled to engage in any
further analysis and never addressed the issue of his specific intent. See Jacobson, 503
U.S. at 550.
109. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev’d on other
grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Higham, 98 F.3d 285, 292 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
prior acts of violence were relevant to the issue of whether the defendant was predisposed
to engage in a murder-for-hire scheme); United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 530-31 (6th
Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence of past cocaine sales were sufficiently similar to the
charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute to show the defendant’s predispo-
sition); United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 742-43 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the defendant’s tape-recorded confession to dealing in stolen lawn equipment was not
admissible because that activity was not similar enough to the crime of unlawfully dealing
in firearms to show predisposition); United States v. Segovia, 576 F.2d 251, 252-53 (9th
Cir. 1978) (concluding that evidence of the defendant’s willingness to arrange the sale of
marijuana was substantially similar to the charge of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine for the purposes of a predisposition inquiry); State v. Burciaga, 705 P.2d 1384,
1387 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding the suppression of evidence showing a past convic-
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this widely applied “substantial similarity” test is not well-
delineated, its purpose is to discriminate between past acts that
demonstrate a general criminal intent and past acts that demon-
strate a form of specific intent.111
D.   Types of Predisposition Evidence
Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the entrapment de-
fense and adopted the subjective standard in Sorrells, evidentiary is-
sues relating to predisposition have been the principal focus of fed-
eral court entrapment inquiries.112 Yet, because of the nebulous na-
ture of any examination of a person’s state of mind, there are no in-
fallible means for distinguishing the non-predisposed innocent from
the predisposed criminal.113 As a consequence, courts use a “totality
of the circumstances” approach in predisposition inquiries.114 This
approach gives courts the ability to consider all relevant factors, yet
it also allows a great deal of judicial discretion and raises the pos-
sibility that courts might incorporate irrelevant, incorrect, or mis-
leading information into their analyses.
Several courts have compiled lists of factors appropriate for dis-
tinguishing predisposed defendants from non-predisposed defen-
                                                                                                                   
tion for theft on the ground that it was not sufficiently similar to the crime of trafficking
in stolen property to demonstrate the defendant’s predisposition); State v. Ross, 540 P.2d
754, 756-57 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that evidence of a past intent to purchase heroin
was insufficiently similar to the charge of selling heroin to show predisposition); Dockery
v. State, 644 N.E.2d 573, 579-81 (Ind. 1994) (reversing a conviction on the ground that
evidence of the defendant’s arrest for the possession of marijuana and illegal firearms,
which took place two years previously, and for selling cocaine to a confidential informant,
which took place one year previously, were insufficiently similar to the crime of dealing in
cocaine to demonstrate predisposition); Powers v. State, 380 N.E.2d 598, 600-01 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978) (finding that evidence of a past conviction for possession of a controlled sub-
stance was substantially similar to the crime of selling narcotics, and thus admissible as
evidence of predisposition); State v. Gibbons, 519 A.2d 350, 357 (N.J. 1987) (holding that
prior convictions for burglary and larceny were insufficiently similar to the crime of nar-
cotics distribution to show that the defendant was predisposed); State v. Stanley, 215
S.E.2d 589, 594-98 (N.C. 1975) (holding that evidence of the defendant’s past possession of
marijuana did not indicate a predisposition to distribute LSD).
111. At best, past act evidence merely demonstrates the defendant’s specific intent
with respect to that type of crime at some time in the past, but not a specific willingness
at the instant that the defendant engaged in the activity for which he is charged. Gener-
ally, evidence of specific intent at the instant of the offense is always admissible to show
predisposition, while evidence of crime-specific intent must meet the “substantial similar-
ity” standard. Evidence of general intent is inadmissible to show predisposition unless it
demonstrates a criminal intent at the precise time of the offense charged. See MARCUS,
supra note 13, at 135-37.
112. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); supra notes 38-49 and accom-
panying text (summarizing Sorrells).
113. See United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 1984).
114. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 135-37.
478 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:463
dants.115 The most detailed of these was produced by the Eighth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Dion.116 The court listed ten such factors:
(1) whether the defendant readily responded to the inducement of-
fered;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct;
(3) “the state of mind of a defendant before government agents
make any suggestion that he shall commit a crime;”
(4) whether the defendant was engaged in an existing course of
conduct similar to the crime for which he is charged;
(5) whether the defendant had already formed the “design” to
commit the crime for which he is charged;
(6) the defendant’s reputation;
(7) the conduct of the defendant during the negotiations with the
undercover agent;
(8) whether the defendant has refused to commit similar acts on
other occasions;
(9) the nature of the crime charged; and
(10) “[t]he degree of coercion present in the instigation law officers
have contributed to the transaction” relative to the “defendant’s
criminal background.”117
Although such lists provide guidance to courts and help prevent law-
yers from overlooking potentially valuable predisposition evidence,
they are necessarily generalized and potentially overbroad. Indeed,
courts have admitted many types of evidence bearing on predisposi-
tion. The most commonly admitted forms of predisposition evidence
may be loosely categorized into similar past acts and crimes, re-
sponse to the inducement, subsequent acts, reputation, and ability to
commit the crime.118
                                                                                                                   
115. See id. at 136-37. Perhaps the most widely cited list was compiled by the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1983). The Court listed five
factors for determining whether a defendant was predisposed to commit a crime:
[T]he character or reputation of the defendant, including any prior criminal re-
cord; whether the suggestion of the criminal activity was initially made by the
Government; whether the defendant was engaged in the criminal activity for
profit; whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to commit the offense,
overcome only by repeated Government inducement or persuasion; and the na-
ture of the inducement or persuasion supplied by the Government.
Id. at 1008. The Seventh Circuit’s inclusion of “the nature of the inducement or persua-
sion supplied by the government” is intriguing because it suggests that the Court is incor-
porating an objective entrapment inquiry into its subjective standard. See United States v.
Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 1985).
116. 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985), modified, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
117. Id. at 687-88 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
118. See generally Bennett, supra note 4, at 850-54.
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1.   Similar Past Acts: Noncriminal Acts, Criminal Convictions,
and Criminal Allegations
In predisposition inquiries, it is important to draw a clear dis-
tinction between prior similar acts and prior similar crimes.119 The
use of acts to show that the defendant was predisposed “involves far
more dangerous possibilities”120 and, as a consequence, the use of
similar noncriminal acts as dispositive evidence of predisposition
was recently foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Jacobson.121 In Ja-
cobson, the court concluded that “[e]vidence of predisposition to do
what [is] lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to show predisposition to
do what is . . . illegal, for there is a common understanding that most
people obey the law even when they disapprove of it.”122
In contrast, the defendant’s history of prior convictions remains a
common form of evidence used by the prosecution to prove predispo-
sition.123 Such evidence is often inadmissible because its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair preju-
dice to the defendant.124 However, if the evidence is used only to re-
but a defense of entrapment and to demonstrate predisposition, then
it is admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.125 The rationale for the admission of this evidence in a predis-
position inquiry is that recidivism rates suggest that one who has
committed a particular type of criminal act is likely to do so again.126
Nevertheless, there are limitations on the types of prior criminal
acts that can be used as evidence of predisposition. To be admissible,
the prior crime generally must either be “similar in kind and rea-
sonably close in time to the crime charged”127 or, alternatively, it
                                                                                                                   
119. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 148.
120. Id.
121. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 551 (1992); supra notes 74-90
(discussing Jacobson).
122. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 551.
123. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 149.
124. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note.
125. See id. Section 404(b) provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the charac-
ter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, how-
ever, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .
. . .
126. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 149.
127. United States v. Crump, 934 F.2d 947, 954 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that testi-
mony concerning the defendant’s past willingness to provide drugs to the witness when-
ever they engaged in sexual activity was sufficiently similar to the charge of narcotics dis-
tribution to show predisposition). See supra note 110 and accompanying text for additional
cases and discussion relating to the “substantial similarity” test. The “closeness in time”
test is decided on a case-by-case basis in which the court applies a reasonableness stan-
dard. In a majority of federal courts, evidence of convictions for similar offenses commit-
ted within the previous nine years are considered reasonably close in time. See W.H.
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must be so “inextricably intertwined” from a factual perspective that
excluding the evidence would leave a “chronological and conceptual
void” in the story heard by the court.128 In addition, like all evidence,
its probative value must substantially outweigh its prejudicial ef-
fect.129
The “similar in kind” and “inextricably intertwined” tests are ex-
emplified by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Swiatek.130 Over the course of several months, an undercover federal
agent and an informant convinced Swiatek that they were amateur
thieves, in part by selling him stolen jewelry and also by soliciting
advice from him about what to do with a car that they had suppos-
edly stolen.131 After a series of meetings, Swiatek eventually sold
firearms and bombs to the federal agent.132 He was subsequently ar-
rested and charged with a variety of federal offenses.133 At trial,
Swiatek raised the defense of entrapment, claiming that the agent
had repeatedly asked for help in procuring such weapons.134
In response, the prosecution presented several forms of evidence
to demonstrate that Swiatek was predisposed to deal in firearms and
explosive devices.135 Among other things, the court admitted evidence
of Swiatek’s claims to have some degree of expertise with explosive
devices, to have owned a garage full of guns before he went to prison,
and to have committed several armed robberies.136 In addition, the
court admitted the agent’s testimony relating Swiatek’s willingness
to deal in stolen jewelry and his apparent willingness to deal in sto-
len cars.137 Swiatek was found guilty and appealed, partly on the
ground that the evidence against him was improperly admitted and
unduly prejudicial.138 For the purposes of the evidence relating to the
jewelry and car, the Seventh Circuit found that it had indeed been
improperly admitted.139 Regarding a predisposition inquiry, the court
found that a willingness to deal in stolen property was insufficiently
similar to the crime of dealing in firearms, and that the past events
                                                                                                                   
Johnson, III, Note, Proving a Criminal Disposition: Separating the Unwary Innocent from
the Unwary Criminal, 43 DUKE L.J. 384, 395-96 (1993).
128. United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1425 (7th Cir. 1984).
129. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
130. 819 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1987).
131. See id. at 727.
132. See id. at 724.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 727-29. There was other evidence admitted to which the defendant ob-
jected on appeal, including evidence of a felony conviction 17 years previously. See id. at
729.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 727.
138. See id. at 726.
139. See id. at 727.
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were not sufficiently factually intertwined with the crime to permit
presentation of that evidence.140 In contrast, the court found that the
evidence relating to Swiatek’s remarks concerning firearms, explo-
sives, and robberies were sufficiently probative of his predisposition,
and therefore admissible, because they were substantially similar to
the nature of the crime charged and were made at nearly the same
time that the crime occurred.141
In addition to demonstrating the application of the “similar in
kind” and “inextricably intertwined” tests, the facts of Swiatek serve
to introduce another evidentiary issue with respect to the use of past
crimes in predisposition inquiries. This is the difference between the
prosecution’s burden of proof for unproven past crimes, such as
Swiatek’s alleged dealing in stolen jewelry, and its burden of proof
for crimes in which the defendant has been previously tried and
convicted. While evidence of a previous conviction must only be
“similar in kind” and reasonably close in time to the offense
charged,142 evidence of an unproven past crime must also be accom-
panied by the introduction of ample evidence for the jury to deter-
mine that the defendant actually committed the crime.143
This is a relatively low burden of persuasion for the prosecution
to meet.144 In Huddleston v. United States ,145 for example, the Su-
preme Court upheld the admission of evidence suggesting that the
defendant had previously sold stolen televisions for the purpose of
demonstrating that he had knowingly engaged in the crime of selling
stolen videotapes.146 The primary evidence supporting the prosecu-
tion’s allegation that the televisions were stolen was “the[ir] low
price . . ., the large quantity offered for sale, and [the defendant’s]
inability to produce a bill of sale.”147 Similarly, in United States v.
                                                                                                                   
140. See id. at 727-28.
141. See id. at 729. Interestingly, the court was unconcerned with whether or not the
defendant’s claims of past crimes were based in fact. The Court noted that the evidentiary
value of the claims was in their capacity to demonstrate that he was “eager to impress
[the agent] with his knowledge and expertise” and therefore predisposed to commit the
crime. Id.
142. See United States v. Crump, 934 F.2d 947, 954 (8th Cir. 1991).
143. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).
144. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Huddleston, the circuits were split con-
cerning the appropriate level of proof. While the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits had all adopted the standard now adopted by the Court, the Second and Sixth Cir-
cuits required the prosecution to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defen-
dant committed the past crime. The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits, on the other hand, required the prosecution to meet the “clear and convincing”
standard before evidence of a defendant’s past crime would be admissible. See id. at 685
n.2.
145. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
146. See id. at 689.
147. Id. at 691.
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York,148 the Seventh Circuit applied this standard and found that the
testimony of a witness that merely related the defendant’s confession
to a similar past crime was admissible, even though the credibility of
the witness was debatable.149
In effect, then, the prosecution is free to present past crime evi-
dence to the jury as long as it is supported by a mere modicum of
proof. This, of course, raises the concern that factually unfounded ac-
cusations of past crimes will be erroneously used to weaken defen-
dants’ cases. In addition, there is a strong possibility that the ad-
mission of past crime evidence, even if it is well-substantiated, will
improperly prejudice the jury.
The prevailing wisdom is that evidence pertaining to an individ-
ual’s history of criminal behavior is relevant to an inquiry into his
propensity for engaging in a similar behavior at a later time.150 De-
spite its relevance, however, the use of such evidence may improp-
erly prejudice a jury in two different ways.151 First, members of the
jury may infer that the defendant is more likely to have committed
the crime charged if she has previously engaged in criminal activ-
ity.152 Second, a juror might conclude that the defendant deserves to
be punished for the past crime, regardless of her involvement in the
crime charged.153 Thus, there is a particularly strong tension be-
tween relevance and prejudicial effect with respect to the use of past-
crimes evidence in predisposition inquiries. Nevertheless, courts are
inclined to conclude that the probative value of past-crimes evidence
is not substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect,
and that it is admissible regardless of its strength or weakness.154
2.   Response to the Inducement and Opportunity to Withdraw
The defendant’s willingness to engage in the crime, or even the
defendant’s failure to demonstrate reluctance at the time of the gov-
ernment’s inducement, may be used by the prosecution as circum-
stantial evidence to demonstrate predisposition.155 Indeed, the de-
fendant’s response to the inducement, whether she demonstrates
                                                                                                                   
148. 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1991).
149. See id. at 1352.
150. See Johnson, supra note 127, at 412.
151. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686.
152. See id.; see also D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge
to the Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289,
323 (1989).
153. See Lewis, supra note 152, at 325.
154. See Johnson, supra note 127, at 398-99.
155. See id. at 402-03.
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strong reluctance, mild reluctance, indifference, or eagerness, is of-
ten the most persuasive evidence of her state of mind.156
As in the case of United States v. Hunt ,157 this type of evidence is
often dispositive when a defendant has admitted the crime but
raised a defense of entrapment. J. Wilton Hunt was a state district
judge in North Carolina from 1974 until his indictment in 1982 for
accepting bribes.158 Pursuant to an informant’s claim that Hunt
could be “delivered,” an undercover FBI agent, posing as the opera-
tor of an illegal gambling operation, arranged to make monthly pay-
ments of $1500 to the judge for “protection.”159 When the agent ini-
tially made the offer, Hunt’s response was merely, “That sounds
good.”160 Although he later expressed a few misgivings about the ar-
rangement, the judge continued to accept payments and said that he
would consider them to be campaign contributions.161 In return for
the “contributions,” he set low bonds for certain people so they could
flee, took care of traffic tickets, and used his influence to assist a
drug smuggling operation.162 Following the judge’s arrest, he unsuc-
cessfully raised the entrapment defense at trial and was convicted163
under North Carolina’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations (RICO) statute.164
On appeal, Hunt argued, among other things, that the evidence of
his predisposition to engage in the offenses charged was insufficient
as a matter of law.165 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument
based on the observation that “no significant pressure or cajoling
was required to secure the judge’s assent,” and that he failed to
withdraw from the arrangement even though he had ample oppor-
tunity.166 Since Hunt failed to make an adequate showing of reluc-
tance, the Fourth Circuit properly concluded that the jury was free
to decide that he was predisposed.167
                                                                                                                   
156. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 141-44. Compare Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369, 373-74 (1958) (finding that the defendant’s “refusal, then his evasiveness, and
then his hesitancy” to repeated requests for drugs by the government informer were a
strong indication that he was not predisposed) with United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d
1004, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding predisposition only because the defendant, a pro-
fessional arsonist, enthusiastically agreed to burn down a building even before learning
how much the government informant would pay for his services).
157. 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1984).
158. See id. at 1080.
159. Id. at 1080-81.
160. Id. at 1081.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1079-80.
164. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-4 (1997).
165. See Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1084.
166. Id. at 1086.
167. See id.
484 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:463
More problematic for courts engaging in predisposition inquiries
are cases in which the defendant initially evinces reluctance, then
engages in actions that demonstrate a willingness to commit the
crime.168 The critical distinction in such cases is whether the defen-
dant’s initial reluctance merely belied a true willingness to partici-
pate in the crime, or whether the government coerced an unwilling
defendant into acting in an incriminating fashion. Two prominent
cases demonstrating this distinction are United States v. Knight 169
and United States v. Perez-Leon .170 In Knight, the defendant agreed
to sell a shotgun to a government agent, but the agent insisted that
he first cut the barrel to an illegal length.171 Knight initially refused
the agent’s demand, even though it was undisputed that he needed
the money, but acceded after the agent contacted him a second
time.172 After being arrested for possession of a sawed-off shotgun,
Knight argued that he had been entrapped.173 The trial court agreed,
concluding that “[t]he Defendant’s reluctance to sell such a weapon
was overcome by repeated Government inducements and the Defen-
dant’s precarious financial condition.”174
In Perez-Leon, the jury came to a different conclusion based on its
determination that the defendant, despite his initial display of reluc-
tance, was a willing participant in the crime.175 In that case, the de-
fendant declined a government informant’s request to participate in
a drug sale, stating that “[he had] been burned before.”176 However,
he then asked for the informant’s phone number and soon became an
“eager” participant in the ensuing drug transactions.177 Based partly
on this eagerness and partly on the defendant’s apparent expertise
in drug-related matters, both the jury and the Seventh Circuit re-
jected his claim that he was a non-predisposed victim of government
inducement.178
In addition to emphasizing the defendant’s active responses to the
government’s inducement, the prosecution may also attempt to prove
predisposition by arguing that the defendant was given an opportu-
nity to withdraw, but failed to do so.179 Generally, courts are hesitant
to conclude that such a failure is a singularly dispositive indication
                                                                                                                   
168. See Johnson, supra note 127, at 405-06.
169. 604 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
170. 757 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1985).
171. See Knight, 604 F. Supp. at 986.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 985.
174. Id. at 987.
175. See Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 872.
176. Id. at 869.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 852.
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that the defendant was predisposed.180 Nevertheless, as in Harrison
v. State,181 a few courts conducting predisposition analyses have
given significant weight to the defendant’s failure to withdraw.182
Winifred Harrison was a guard at the Smyrna Correctional Insti-
tution in Delaware.183 An inmate at the prison, Barlow, who was
working as an informant for the state police, became aware that
Harrison was violating prison rules by bringing food into the facil-
ity.184 Based only on this information, Barlow approached Harrison
and offered her a hundred dollars to smuggle marijuana to him.185
She eventually acceded and met Barlow’s outside contact, an under-
cover police lieutenant named Williams, to purchase the mari-
juana.186 At each of their meetings, Williams offered Harrison the
opportunity to withdraw, but she refused.187 Harrison was arrested
after making two deliveries of marijuana to Barlow.188
At trial, Harrison unsuccessfully argued that she had not been
predisposed to commit the crime and that she had been entrapped.189
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court conceded that the only evi-
dence of Harrison’s predisposition was her failure to withdraw, yet it
concluded that this evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject her
entrapment defense.190 Consequently, the court affirmed her convic-
tion.191
 The defendant’s immediate response to the government’s in-
ducement is one of the most widely used forms of evidence in predis-
position inquiries. Its value is that, unlike other types of predisposi-
tion evidence, it is probative of the defendant’s state of mind at the
time of the inducement, rather than at some other time and under
                                                                                                                   
180. There have been numerous cases in which the defendant had days or even
months to think about the inducement and ultimately failed to withdraw, yet the court
still found that he or she was not predisposed. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503
U.S. 540, 554 (1992); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 374 (1958); United States v.
Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 690 (8th Cir.), modified, 476 U.S. 734 (1985); United States v. Knight,
604 F. Supp. 984, 987 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
181. 442 A.2d 1377 (Del. 1982).
182. See, e.g., id. at 1386; United States v. Miller, 71 F.3d 813, 817 (11th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d 649, 655 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kaminski,
703 F.2d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1983); State v. Schillaci, 526 N.E.2d 871, 876 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988).
183. See Harrison, 442 A.2d at 1379.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 1380. There was conflicting testimony concerning the amount of reluc-
tance shown by Harrison at the time of the inducement. While the informant claimed that
Harrison merely deliberated for an hour or two, she testified that she rebuffed his re-
peated requests for a month before finally agreeing to participate. See id. at 1379-80.
187. See id. at 1380.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 1381.
190. See id. at 1386.
191. See id. at 1388.
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different circumstances. In contrast, the value of failure-to-withdraw
evidence is that it may indicate the defendant’s willingness to en-
gage in the criminal activity even though there has been a passage of
time during which she has had an opportunity to carefully weigh the
circumstances and the consequences of her actions. However, courts
must consider the circumstances surrounding such forms of evidence
carefully, for both an initially positive response and a subsequent
failure to withdraw may merely suggest a reluctant, or even a fear-
induced, submissiveness to an overwhelming inducement rather
than an ardent willingness to engage in a crime.
3.   Subsequent Acts and Statements
While proof of a defendant’s predisposition often pivots on the
character of her acts preceding or during the crime, the prosecution
may also present evidence that she later engaged in similar activ-
ity.192 Like evidence of prior criminal acts, an admissible subsequent
act must either be similar in nature and reasonably close in time to
the crime charged, or be “inextricably intertwined” with it.193 Of
course, its probative value must also substantially outweigh its
prejudicial effect.194 The reasoning behind the admission of subse-
quent act evidence is that “the defendant’s continuation of the pro-
hibited conduct after the removal of the government inducement in-
dicates that it was not the government’s inducement that motivated
the defendant to commit the charged offense, but some other, con-
tinuing factor.”195
As this reasoning suggests, the prosecution often presents subse-
quent act evidence to show that a defendant has actively engaged in
similar illegal conduct even after the government’s inducement
ceases. In United States v. Burkley ,196 for instance, the government
introduced evidence that the defendant sold heroin to an undercover
                                                                                                                   
192. See, e.g., United States v. Posner, 865 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[E]vidence
of the defendant’s subsequent, extrinsic offense [is] admissible because it fairly rebut[s] [a]
claim of entrapment by proving disposition to commit a criminal act.”); United States v.
Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that
there should be a per se rule against the admission of “subsequent act” evidence); United
States v. Mack, 643 F.2d 1119, 1122-25 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that evidence of subse-
quent crimes was admissible to establish predisposition); United States v. Burkley, 591
F.2d 903, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that the defendant’s ability to access large quanti-
ties of heroin in November was probative of his predisposition to sell heroin the previous
September); United States v. Brown, 567 F.2d 119, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The [issue] is not
whether the events sought to be introduced occurred before, during, or after commission
of the alleged offense. The question is whether the events are relevant to and probative of
defendant’s willingness to commit the crime.”).
193. See Johnson, supra note 127, at 401.
194. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
195. Johnson, supra note 127, at 401.
196. 591 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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police officer on November 8, partly for the purpose of demonstrating
that the defendant had been predisposed when he sold the same offi-
cer heroin on September 9.197 By doing so, the prosecution success-
fully rebutted the defendant’s claim of entrapment, even though the
police officer initiated the contact with the defendant.198
For the purpose of demonstrating a defendant’s predisposition,
most courts also admit evidence that she was merely “willing” to en-
gage in similar conduct after the government discontinued its in-
ducement. As in Burkley, the defendant in United States v.
Jenkins199 attempted to raise the entrapment defense after being
charged with selling heroin to undercover agents.200 Although there
was no evidence that Jenkins had ever engaged in any other crimi-
nal activity, the Fifth Circuit found that he was predisposed merely
because he made the statement, “[I]f you need more, I’ll be here,” af-
ter the sale was completed.201
Thus, subsequent actions and statements may both be properly
admitted to demonstrate a defendant’s predisposition.202 Yet, by
admitting this type of evidence, courts sometimes ignore the possibil-
ity that the government’s inducement and coercion at the time of the
crime charged may have engendered the defendant’s subsequent
“predisposition.” For example, the admission of statement evidence
ignores the ease with which such statements can be elicited by police
officers hoping to defeat the defendant’s ability to invoke the en-
trapment defense. This is particularly true when complaisant re-
marks such as “[I]f you need more, I’ll be here” are considered to be
dispositive evidence that the defendant was predisposed.203 Jenkins
made that statement immediately after the transaction was com-
pleted, when he could have been flush with the prospect of making a
significant amount of money.204 For the purposes of a predisposition
inquiry, an offhand remark made in the heat of such a moment has
little relevance to the issue of whether Jenkins was willing and
ready to engage in drug trafficking prior to the government’s in-
ducement. Despite the Fifth Circuit’s holding to the contrary, courts
should preclude similar remarks as a matter of law on the grounds of
                                                                                                                   
197. See id. at 921-22. Burkley was tried for both crimes in a consolidated trial. See id.
at 907.
198. See id. at 907. Although the prosecution also presented other evidence to demon-
strate that the defendant was predisposed, none of it appears to have been dispositive.
This included proof of the ease with which Burkley obtained high-quality heroin and repu-
tation testimony by an apparently unreliable witness. See id. at 910.
199. 480 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1973).
200. See id. at 1199.
201. Id. at 1200.
202. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 158.
203. Jenkins, 480 F.2d at 1200.
204. See id.
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irrelevance or insufficiency, rather than allowing them to foreclose
an otherwise well-grounded defense of entrapment.
4.   Defendant’s Reputation and Hearsay
While the issue of predisposition is most commonly resolved
through an assessment of the defendant’s actions before, during, and
after the time of the inducement, evidence of the defendant’s repu-
tation in the community may also bear on the issue.205 In the past, it
was often the prosecution that sought to use reputation evidence to
show that the defendant was predisposed.206 However, as courts are
becoming more wary about the prejudicial effects of such testi-
mony,207 it is increasingly the defendants who are introducing repu-
tation evidence in the hope of bolstering claims of non-
predisposition.
This was the situation in United States v. Fedroff ,208 when the de-
fendant proffered reputation evidence to show that, prior to the gov-
ernment’s involvement, he had not been predisposed to commit the
crimes of mail fraud, extortion, and accepting kickbacks.209 Joseph
Fedroff was the acting superintendent of public works in North Ar-
lington, New Jersey, when FBI agents investigating official corrup-
tion targeted that town.210 An undercover agent, posing as a steel
salesman, approached Fedroff and solicited contracts from him.211
After the town placed its first order, the agent met Fedroff at a local
bar and handed him $100, saying “Here’s a hundred bucks many
thanks Joe . . . We appreciate your business you guys are super
O.K.”212 Later, after Fedroff accepted additional payments and gra-
tuities from the agent, he was arrested.213
At trial, Fedroff asserted that he had been entrapped and he had
two character witnesses testify on his behalf to show his “good repu-
tation and lack of prior involvement in this kind of illegal activity.”214
Fedroff argued that this testimony, considered in light of the fact
that he never actually requested money from the agent, was evi-
dence of his non-predisposition.215 However, the court refused to give
                                                                                                                   
205. See, e.g., United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Fedroff, 874 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548
F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977).
206. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 153.
207. See id. at 154.
208. 874 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1989).
209. See id. at 183.
210. See id. at 179-80.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 180.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 183.
215. See id.
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an entrapment instruction to the jury and Fedroff was found
guilty.216 On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed that the defendant’s
evidence of non-predisposition, although not substantial, was enough
to warrant the instruction, so it ordered a new trial.217
Testimony concerning a person’s reputation in the community is
an express exception under the Federal Rules of Evidence to the
prohibition against the use of hearsay at trial.218 Nevertheless, the
admissibility of reputation evidence to demonstrate predisposition is
subject to various limitations, including the omnipresent Rule 403
stipulation that any evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.219 All
federal circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that
the prosecution may not present hearsay evidence of reputation be-
cause of the danger of unfair prejudice.220 As a consequence, the only
reputation-related statements that are admissible in federal courts
to show predisposition are those that are not hearsay, such as
statements made by the defendant herself221 or by her co-
conspirator.222 Of course, this has no effect on the defendant’s ability
to present reputation evidence tending to demonstrate non-
predisposition.
5.   Defendant’s Ability to Commit the Crime
Courts have used a defendant’s ability to commit the crime to in-
fer predisposition. Courts have also used a defendant’s apparent in-
ability to commit the crime to infer non-predisposition. Although
these two inquiries are facially similar, it is important to distinguish
between them. An ability to commit a crime is often a strong indica-
tion of predisposition, while an inability to commit the crime is not a
reliable gauge of non-predisposition.
When the defendant committed the crime with particular ease, a
jury may use this fact alone to infer that she was predisposed. This
commonly takes place in trials for drug trafficking when the defen-
                                                                                                                   
216. See id. at 182.
217. See id. at 184-85. Following the defendant’s conviction, but before his sentencing,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988), holding
that a defendant may deny one or more elements of a crime and still be entitled to raise
the defense of entrapment. See id. at 61-64. In light of the Mathews decision, the Third
Circuit concluded that Fedroff was also entitled to a new trial so that he could present
additional reputation evidence that he was previously foreclosed from using. See Fedroff,
874 F.2d at 186.
218. See FED. R. EVID. 803(21).
219. See Johnson, supra note 127, at 407-08.
220. See id. at 403. The Fifth Circuit allowed reputation evidence in predisposition in-
quiries until 1981, when it explicitly reversed its position in the landmark case of United
States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
221. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
222. See id. at 801(d)(2)(E).
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dant was able to deliver large amounts of contraband to undercover
police officers in a relatively short period of time.223 It also commonly
occurs when a defendant argues that she was entrapped even though
she demonstrated a high degree of expertise in the type of criminal
activity with which she is charged.224 Since ease and expertise tend
to demonstrate preparation and past experience, there is a strong
rational basis for concluding that the defendant’s criminal abilities
are a reflection of her predisposition at the time of the government’s
inducement.
However, the converse is not necessarily true. A defendant’s in-
ability to commit a crime may merely demonstrate ineptitude, rather
than non-predisposition. Nevertheless, the defense has, on occasion,
successfully argued that the inability of the defendant to commit the
crime demonstrates non-predisposition. In United States v.
Hollingsworth,225 for example, the Seventh Circuit found that the de-
fendants were not predisposed to engage in international money
laundering because they did not have the necessary “underworld
contacts, financial acumen or assets, access to foreign banks or
bankers, or other assets.”226 For this reason, the court concluded that
the defendants were “objectively harmless” and reversed their con-
victions.227
The flaw in the reasoning of the Hollingsworth majority lies in its
emphasis on actual ability.228 Actual ability is irrelevant because an
inability to complete the crime does not preclude the possibility that
the defendant was an eager, albeit overconfident, participant. The
proper focus of a non-predisposition inquiry is not whether the de-
fendant was “objectively harmless,” but whether the defendant sub-
jectively perceived herself to have the ability to commit the crime at
the time of the government’s inducement. Therefore, if a defendant
wishes to show non-predisposition using ability evidence, she must
demonstrate that at the time of the inducement she did not believe
that she would be able to commit the crime.
                                                                                                                   
223. See, e.g., United States v. Gunter, 741 F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1984); Gossmeyer v.
State, 482 N.E.2d 239, 241 (Ind. 1985); State v. Stahl, 482 N.W.2d 829, 838 (Neb. 1992).
224. See, e.g., United States v. Aikens, 64 F.3d 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that
the defendant was predisposed because he demonstrated skill and sophistication when
selling crack cocaine to an undercover officer); United States v. Lakich, 23 F.3d 1203,
1209-10 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hernandez, 31 F.3d 354, 360 (6th Cir. 1994)
(finding that by giving sophisticated advice to an undercover officer about cocaine traffick-
ing, one defendant demonstrated that he was not an innocent dupe); United States v.
Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir. 1993); Collins v. State, 520 N.E.2d 1258, 1260-61
(Ind. 1988).
225. 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
226. Id. at 1202.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 1205-11 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
1998]                        ENTRAPMENT AND DUE PROCESS 491
E.   A Critique of the Subjective Approach
In theory, the subjective approach properly distinguishes a will-
ing participant in a criminal venture from an unwary innocent. Its
primary advantage is that those who would not have committed a
crime on their own are not punished for committing it at the behest
of the government,229 which has extraordinary resources at its com-
mand and an unmatched power to coerce unsuspecting individuals.
Despite this advantage, the subjective analysis is not philosophi-
cally well-founded. A widely discussed concern is that its legal foun-
dation--congressional intent--is extraordinarily tenuous considering
that the defendant has, in fact, engaged in legislatively proscribed
conduct.230 Furthermore, the subjective approach neither offers guid-
ance to the police concerning their conduct in difficult situations nor
dissuades improper police inducement of crime.231 Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, the distinction between predisposed defen-
dants and non-predisposed defendants is not predicated on a well-
reasoned concept of moral blameworthiness.232 Although two people
might succumb to identical temptations, the subjective approach
prescribes that the predisposed defendant is “guilty,” while the non-
predisposed defendant is “innocent.”233 Yet, there is no reasonable
basis for holding persons with criminal records or imperfect reputa-
tions to a higher standard of ethical responsibility than those who
have avoided, or perhaps merely escaped, being similarly stigma-
tized.234
The subjective approach is also plagued by difficulties in practical
application. One of the more vexing problems with the approach is
that, in order to demonstrate predisposition, the prosecution may in-
troduce a broad array of otherwise inadmissible evidence dealing
with the defendant’s prior unsavory or illegal activities.235 This evi-
                                                                                                                   
229. See Paton, supra note 90, at 1029.
230. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). Recall that in Sorrells, the Court adopted subjective entrapment based on its con-
clusion that Congress could not have intended for statutes to be enforced by tempting in-
nocent persons into committing crimes. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448
(1932). Justice Roberts strongly objected to this “strained and unwarranted construction
of the statute” that “is not merely broad construction, but [provides the] addition of an
element not contained in the legislation.” Id. at 456.
231. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 385.
232. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 1038.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 1038-39.
235. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In
Sorrells, the majority casually dismissed this concern, stating that: “if the defendant seeks
acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching in-
quiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue. If in conse-
quence he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon himself.” Sorrells, 287 U.S. at
451.
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dence is often unreliable and highly prejudicial.236 Exacerbating this
problem is the fact that subjective inquiries are notoriously inaccu-
rate and difficult despite the wide variety of evidence used to inquire
into the defendant’s state of mind. Indeed, judges and juries have
repeatedly demonstrated a tendency, when faced with a melange of
predisposition evidence, to ignore the “totality of the circumstances”
methodology by simply concluding that a single factor is a dispositive
indicator of the defendant’s predisposition.
 For example, in United States v. Akinsanya ,237 the jury found that
the defendant was predisposed to sell heroin solely on the basis that
he was able to obtain 100 grams of it relatively quickly, despite
strong character evidence indicating that he was not predisposed
and the notable fact that the government agent’s initial attempts to
purchase drugs from him failed.238 Similarly, in United States v.
Bogart,239 the defendant repeatedly expressed an unwillingness to
become involved in the narcotics sale for which he was later charged,
but nonetheless he was absolutely barred from invoking the entrap-
ment defense at trial solely because his criminal background sug-
gested that he may have been predisposed.240 In Dion, the trial court
found that one of the defendants, Lyle Dion, was predisposed to sell
eagle parts in violation of federal law based merely on the fact that
he had responded to the inducement.241 However, the Eighth Circuit
properly overruled his conviction because it was undisputed that
Dion, an impoverished Native American, had never previously killed
an eagle and had only responded after undercover agents spent
nearly two years offering substantial amounts of money for the
parts.242
In each of these cases, the defendant was almost certainly disin-
clined to commit the crime charged at the time of the government’s
initial contact and inducement. Nevertheless, in each of these cases
a single factor (the defendant’s ability to commit the crime, his
criminal background, and his response to the inducement) was con-
sidered by either the judge or the jury to be a dispositive indicator of
his predisposition.243 By ignoring the “totality of the circumstances”
                                                                                                                   
236. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 443.
237. 53 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 1995).
238. See id. at 858.
239. 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986).
240. See id. at 1430-32; infra notes 405-18 and accompanying text (summarizing
Bogart).
241. See United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 685 (1985).
242. See id. at 686.
243. See also United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1984) (overturning
the defendant’s conviction for transporting a pipe bomb because he had repeatedly re-
jected the government’s inducements and had no criminal record for related offenses);
United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1113-14 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that the defen-
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methodology when determining the defendant’s predisposition, these
courts effectively undermined the Supreme Court’s stated goal of ex-
culpating the defendant when the crime occurred only because of the
government’s inducement.244
III.   THE OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO ENTRAPMENT: THE COMPETING
THEORY
A.   Introduction: The Birth of the Objective Approach
The gravamen of the objective view of entrapment is whether the
police conduct “falls below standards, to which common feelings re-
spond, for the proper use of governmental power.”245 According to
this test, which is also known as the “reasonable law-abiding person
approach,”246 if the government’s method of inducement was likely to
induce an ordinarily law-abiding citizen to break the law, then the
charges should be dismissed even if the accused was ready and
willing to commit the offense.247 Unlike the subjective inquiry, which
is an issue of fact for the jury, the objective determination is an issue
of law decided by the judge.248
The foundation for the objective approach to entrapment is trace-
able to Justice Brandeis’ dissent in the 1928 case of Casey v. United
States.249 Casey, a lawyer, was convicted of illegally purchasing and
delivering morphine to prison inmates.250 After jailers noticed that
drug addicts in the prison repeatedly appeared to be under the influ-
ence of narcotics following Casey’s visits, federal narcotics officers
persuaded two informants to approach Casey and ask him to procure
morphine for them.251 They gave Casey money in advance and he
later delivered a morphine-soaked towel to one of them.252 Although
a majority of the Court upheld Casey’s subsequent conviction, Jus-
tice Brandeis voted to reverse it on the ground that “the act for
which the Government seeks to punish the defendant is the fruit of
[the government agent’s] criminal conspiracy to induce its commis-
sion.”253 He based his position on the need to protect the integrity of
the government and its courts.254
                                                                                                                   
dant, who had no criminal record, repeatedly refused to participate in a drug transaction
until the government agent continually increased the pressure over a long period of time).
244. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 444 (1932).
245. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
246. ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 520-21.
247. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383-84.
248. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457.
249. 276 U.S. 413 (1928).
250. See id. at 416.
251. See id. at 422.
252. See id. at 423.
253. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
254. See id. at 425.
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Justice Brandeis’ reasoning foreshadowed a sequence of minority
opinions by various justices, each of whom argued for the use of the
objective analysis in entrapment cases. The first of these, of course,
was Justice Roberts’ concurrence in Sorrells, in which he opined that
“the true foundation of [the entrapment] doctrine [is] the public pol-
icy which protects the purity of government and its processes.”255 He
felt that it “is the province of the court and of the court alone to pro-
tect itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal
law” regardless of the defendant’s state of mind when committing
the crime.256
B.   The Nature of the Objective Inquiry and Its Adoption by Various
States
Building on Justice Brandeis’ and Justice Roberts’ reasoning,
Justice Frankfurter in Sherman proffered the first explicit statement
of an objective entrapment standard:
[I]n holding out inducements [the government] should act in such a
manner as is likely to induce to the commission of crime only
[those persons already willing to engage in criminal conduct] and
not others who would normally avoid crime and through self-
struggle resist ordinary temptations. . . . The power of government
is abused and directed to an end for which it was not constituted
when employed to promote rather than detect crime and to bring
about the downfall of those who, left to themselves, might well
have obeyed the law.257
Even though the objective approach to entrapment would allow cul-
pable defendants to go free, Justice Frankfurter argued that it was
“less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Govern-
ment should play an ignoble part.”258
In 1973, Justice Frankfurter’s formulation of the objective ap-
proach was embraced and reiterated by Justice Stewart in his dis-
senting opinion in United States v. Russell .259 That case involved a
defendant, Russell, who was convicted of illegally manufacturing
methamphetamine.260 Although conceding that he was predisposed
to commit the crime, Russell argued that he was entrapped when a
government agent supplied an essential chemical for the process,
                                                                                                                   
255. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 455 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring); see
also supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text (summarizing Sorrells).
256. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457.
257. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
see also supra notes 53-62 (summarizing Sherman).
258. Id. at 380 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
259. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
260. See id. at 426.
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thereby contributing to a criminal enterprise and violating Russell’s
constitutional right to due process.261 The majority affirmed Russell’s
conviction and rejected his due process argument,262 finding instead
that his admission of predisposition was “fatal to his claim of en-
trapment.”263 In a forceful dissent, Justice Stewart reiterated Justice
Roberts’ desire to maintain the purity of the government and offered
an objective entrapment standard similar to that proposed by Justice
Frankfurter:
[W]hen the agents’ involvement in criminal activities goes beyond
the mere offering of such an opportunity and when their conduct is
of a kind that could induce or instigate the commission of a crime
by one not ready and willing to commit it, then—regardless of the
character or propensities of the particular person induced—I think
entrapment has occurred.264
Applying this standard, Justice Stewart suggested that Russell was
entrapped as a matter of law.265
Although the objective approach to entrapment has never com-
manded a majority in the U.S. Supreme Court, both the American
Law Institute and a minority of states have adopted it over the past
thirty-five years. The first to do so was the American Law Institute,
which incorporated the objective standard into the Model Penal Code
(MPC) in 1962.266 The MPC approach closely traces the Roberts-
Frankfurter-Stewart-Brennan formulation of an objective standard
by focusing the inquiry exclusively on the actions of the govern-
ment.267 It requires the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the
                                                                                                                   
261. See id. at 426-28; infra notes 375-85 and accompanying text (discussing the de-
fendant’s due process defense).
262. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 430.
263. Id. at 436. The majority also expressed a strong disapproval of the objective stan-
dard, stating that the entrapment defense “was not intended to give the federal judiciary a
‘chancellor’s foot’ veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve.” Id. at
435.
264. Id. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, the same three justices who argued for the adoption of the objective
standard of entrapment three years later. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,
496 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
265. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 449-50. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan, also
wrote a separate dissenting opinion in Russell. Quoting Justices Brandeis, Roberts, and
Frankfurter extensively, he similarly argued for the adoption of the objective approach to
entrapment. See id. at 436 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
266. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 39.
267. Section 2.13 provides that:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with
such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evi-
dence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another per-
son to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that
such conduct is not prohibited; or
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evidence, that her illegal conduct was merely a response to the gov-
ernment’s entrapment.268
Since the adoption of the objective approach by the American Law
Institute, thirteen states have followed suit either through judicial
pronouncement or legislative enactment.269 The first state to do so
was Alaska, which adopted the objective standard in 1969 when its
Supreme Court decided the case of Grossman v. State. 270 Before pre-
senting a historical review of the debate over the objective and sub-
jective approaches, the court stated that “the underlying basis of en-
trapment is found in public policy.”271 It rejected the reasoning of the
Sorrells majority, arguing that “[t]o speak of entrapment as an im-
plied statutory condition, and then to focus inquiry on the origin of
intent, the implantation of criminal design, and the predisposition of
the defendant does not make much sense.”272 Instead, the court ex-
plicitly adopted the objective approach, concluding that “[a]n exter-
nal standard, if it can be achieved, is certainly preferable to a doc-
trine founded in theoretical riddles.”273
                                                                                                                   
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other that those who
are ready to commit it.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a person prosecuted for
an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that
his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment
shall be tried by the Court in the absence of the jury.
(3) The defense afforded by this Section is unavailable when causing or threat-
ening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is
based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985).
268. See id. § 2.13(2).
269. The states that currently follow the objective approach include Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and
Vermont. See Paton, supra note 90, at 1002 n.45. The thirteenth state, North Dakota, ini-
tially adopted the objective standard. However, in 1993 its legislature added a subjective
element to the entrapment statute, thereby creating a hybrid approach. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1993). For a further discussion of the hybrid approach, see infra Part
IV.
270. 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969). In Grossman, a government agent, assigned to report
on drug-related activities in the Anchorage area, befriended the defendant. Over the fol-
lowing months, the agent requested and purchased marijuana and amphetamines from
the defendant on various occasions. Eventually, the agent asked the defendant to procure
some “hard stuff” for a friend of his in Fairbanks who needed a new contact. Five days
later, the defendant complied and was later convicted of supplying the agent with 10
“fixes” of morphine. The Alaska Supreme Court, after adopting the objective standard,
remanded the case back to the trial level for a judicial determination of whether Gross-
man had been entrapped as a matter of law. See id. at 230-31.
271. Id. at 227.
272. Id. at 229.
273. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court formulated the objective test as follows:
[U]nlawful entrapment occurs when a public law enforcement official, or a per-
son working in cooperation with him, in order to obtain evidence of the com-
mission of an offense, induces another person to commit such an offense by
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Most states that have adopted the objective approach to entrap-
ment have done so by legislative enactment. In the early 1970s, for
example, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Utah, Texas, and
Arkansas all promulgated statutes requiring the application of the
objective standard.274 Typically, these statutes are modeled after the
MPC’s formulation275 or on Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Sher-
man.276 In recent years, movement towards the adoption of an objec-
tive approach has waned, perhaps because the subjective view has
continued to be a strongly entrenched tenet of the U.S. Supreme
Court.277
C.   A Critique of the Objective Approach
The principal advantage of the objective inquiry “may simply be
that it avoids the problems of the subjective” approach.278 The focus
of the inquiry is wholly upon the facts of the case and the legitimacy
of the government’s actions, rather than on the state of mind or prior
conduct of an individual.279 Not only is the factual inquiry thereby
simplified, but the judge may also properly exclude prejudicial evi-
dence pertaining to the defendant’s reputation, criminal activities,
and prior convictions.280 Furthermore, the objective approach leads to
greater equity of treatment between similarly situated defendants
than does the subjective approach. As Justice Frankfurter stated in
Sherman, “[S]urely if two suspects have been solicited at the same
time in the same manner, one should not go to jail simply because he
has been convicted before and is said to have a criminal disposi-
tion.”281 By shifting the focus of the inquiry away from the defendant
and onto the government’s actions, the objective inquiry circumvents
this unfairness.
In addition, the objective approach enables judges to critique and
correct the past actions of the police, thereby helping to deter future
police misconduct.282 As a consequence, the consistent application of
an objective standard would eventually allow the judiciary to pre-
                                                                                                                   
persuasion or inducement which would be effective to persuade an average
person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit such an offense.
Id.
274. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 43.
275. See supra note 267.
276. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 43; supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text
(discussing Sherman).
277. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 43.
278. Id. at 103.
279. See Paton, supra note 90, at 1030.
280. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
281. Id. at 383.
282. See Paton, supra note 90, at 1031.
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cisely define the outer limits of acceptable police behavior. It was
this characteristic that compelled Justice Roberts in 1932 to argue
for the adoption of an objective approach to entrapment.283 “[U]nlike
the fiction of contravening legislative intent by finding an entrapped
defendant guilty” under the subjective approach, the objective ap-
proach places restraints on society’s and Justice Roberts’ predomi-
nant concern of governmental overreaching.284
A difficulty with the objective approach is that it places a great
deal of emphasis on the behavior of a hypothetical, reasonable law-
abiding person.285 For example, the Alaska Supreme Court in Gross-
man focused its inquiry on “persuasion or inducement which would
be effective to persuade an ‘average person,’ other than one who is
ready and willing, to commit such an offense.”286 As a consequence of
this emphasis, the objective standard may be too abstract and diffi-
cult to apply.287 In fact, ten years after its Grossman decision, the
Alaska Supreme Court was forced to admit that:
we have come to realize that there are certain difficulties in apply-
ing the [average person] standard. An “average person” probably
cannot be induced to commit a serious crime except under circum-
stances so extreme as to amount to duress. Yet it is clear that en-
trapment may occur where the degree of inducement falls short of
actual duress.288
To reduce this problem, the Alaska Supreme Court shifted the em-
phasis of its objective inquiry by indicating that the entrapment de-
fense is appropriate when there has been “unreasonable or uncon-
scionable efforts on the part of the police to induce one to commit a
crime.”289
Perhaps the most compelling criticism of the objective inquiry is
that it is overinclusive.290 That is, by focusing the inquiry exclusively
on the conduct of the government, it relieves defendants of liability
regardless of their degree of culpability or predilection for commit-
ting the offense.291 Thus, an indurate criminal might be “acquitted at
                                                                                                                   
283. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., concur-
ring); supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text (summarizing Justice Robert’s argu-
ment).
284. MARCUS, supra note 13, at 104 (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 379 (Frankfurter,
J,. concurring)).
285. See Paton, supra note 90, at 1031.
286. Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969).
287. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 104.
288. Pascu v. State, 577 P.2d 1064, 1066-67 (Alaska 1978).
289. Id. at 1067.
290. See Moore, supra note 6, at 1169.
291. See id.
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a substantial cost to the deterrent credibility of” the criminal justice
system and in contravention of society’s concept of fair justice.292
IV.   HYBRID APPROACHES TO ENTRAPMENT: ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE
THE SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE DICHOTOMY
A few states have developed alternative entrapment doctrines
that include both objective and subjective elements.293 The New Jer-
sey, Florida, Indiana, and North Dakota legislatures have all prom-
ulgated hybrid entrapment statutes, while New Hampshire and New
Mexico have adopted hybrid approaches by way of judicial pro-
nouncement.294 The ultimate intent underlying the adoption of these
hybrid approaches is to reap the benefits of both the subjective and
objective inquiries, while minimizing the problems associated with
each.
A.   The Composite Hybrid Approach
In New Jersey, Indiana, and New Hampshire, the entrapment
standard is a mixture of the subjective and objective approaches into
a single two-pronged inquiry.295 This standard, which will be termed
the “composite hybrid approach,” is exemplified by the Indiana en-
trapment statute:
(a) It is a defense that:
(1) the prohibited conduct of the person was the product of a law
enforcement officer, or his agent, using persuasion or other means
likely to cause the person to engage in the conduct; and;
(2) the person was not predisposed to commit the offense.
(b) Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit
the offense does not constitute entrapment.296
Typically, to successfully raise a defense of entrapment under the
composite approach, the defendant must first demonstrate either
that the government’s inducement created a substantial risk that
the average person would commit the crime, or that its conduct was
so egregious as to “impugn the integrity of the court that permits a
                                                                                                                   
292. Id.
293. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 44-47.
294. See Paton, supra note 90, at 1005; Doug Nesheim, Comment, Criminal Law—
Entrapment: Illegal Police Conduct Gets Stung by the Entrapment Defense in State v.
Kummer, 69 N.D. L. REV. 969, 993-96 (1993).
295. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-9 (Michie
1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (1996).
296. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-9 (Michie 1997) (emphasis added).
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conviction.”297 Second, the defendant must prove no predisposition to
commit the crime.298
While the various creators of the composite hybrid approach pre-
sumably aspired to maximize the fairness and benefits associated
with the entrapment defense, they merely succeeded in negating the
benefits of the individual subjective and objective approaches. The
primary societal benefit of the subjective standard is that those who
would not commit a crime on their own are not punished for com-
mitting it at the behest of the government.299 However, this benefit is
significantly diminished under the composite approach when an ad-
ditional burden is placed on the defendant to prove that the police
used improper or egregious methods to coerce her behavior. One of
the principal advantages of the objective standard is that it avoids
some of the difficulties of the subjective standard—there is no need
to introduce prejudicial evidence of the defendant’s reputation or
past behavior, and there is greater equity of treatment between
predisposed and non-predisposed defendants.300 These advantages,
too, are lost under the composite hybrid approach because the defen-
dant is still required to answer the subjective inquiry concerning her
predisposition.
In addition, by placing a two-pronged burden on the defendant, a
composite entrapment defense is likely to be underinclusive.
“Predisposed” defendants might still fall victim to egregious police
tactics, while non-predisposed defendants will face the significant
burden of meeting an abstract and unclear “average person” stan-
dard. Furthermore, because it is underinclusive, there will be little
deterrent effect on government overreaching. While courts will still
have opportunities to critique the inducement tactics used by the
police, many defendants will nevertheless be convicted for failing to
meet the subjective prong. In such instances, the judicial criticism
will be relegated to the status of dicta, which police officers will have
little incentive to heed.
Indiana, while maintaining a composite hybrid approach to en-
trapment, has attempted to avoid the problem of underinclusiveness
by shifting the burden of persuasion to the prosecution.301 The prose-
cution must rebut a defense of entrapment by showing both that the
level of police inducement did not affect the free will of the defendant
                                                                                                                   
297. State v. Fogarty, 607 A.2d 624, 627 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1992).
298. In New Jersey, this burden of proof is placed on the defendant, who must prove
each prong by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Florez, 636 A.2d 1040,
1047 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1994).
299. See supra text accompanying note 229.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 278-84.
301. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (Ind. 1991).
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and that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.302 This
burden of persuasion is not always as insurmountable as it might be,
since the Indiana Supreme Court has declared that the prosecution
may meet it by “show[ing] circumstances which establish the crimi-
nal predisposition of the accused including his possession of large
quantities of contraband, his ability to access contraband in a short
time, his knowledge of prices and sources and his manner of conduct-
ing the sale of contraband itself.”303
Despite this apparent easing of the burden of persuasion, Indi-
ana’s approach has the potential to be seriously overinclusive. Every
defendant that can show the slightest inducement on the part of the
government will raise the entrapment defense and then sit back to
see if the prosecution can meet its burden. If the state fails then her
entrapment defense succeeds. Furthermore, if the prosecution pres-
ents a substantial amount of evidence to demonstrate predisposition,
and this evidence is not unlawful conduct sufficiently similar to the
crime charged, then the case against the defendant may be reversed
because the jury was unduly prejudiced.304
The 1994 case of Dockery v. State305 illustrates the potential diffi-
culties of Indiana’s approach. The case arose when an undercover
officer told Jackson that he wanted to purchase cocaine.306 Jackson
then took the officer to the street in front of the home of the defen-
dant, Dockery.307 After speaking only with Jackson, Dockery weighed
out a specific amount of cocaine, carried it out to the officer’s car, and
sold it to him for $250.308 Dockery was subsequently arrested. In re-
sponse to Dockery’s defense of entrapment, the prosecution pre-
sented evidence of his predisposition, including his arrest three
years previously for the possession of marijuana and an illegal fire-
arm.309 In addition, the prosecution presented the testimony of a po-
lice officer who stated that stated Dockery had sold cocaine to a con-
fidential informant two years previously.310 Although Dockery was
found guilty the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
concluding that the prosecution’s evidence was not sufficiently simi-
lar to the crime charged to prove that Dockery was predisposed to
                                                                                                                   
302. See Baird v. State, 446 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind. 1983).
303. Gossmeyer v. State, 482 N.E.2d 239, 241 (Ind. 1985).
304. See Powers v. State, 380 N.E.2d 598, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
305. 644 N.E.2d 573 (Ind. 1994).
306. See id. at 575.
307. See id. at 575-76.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 576. That case was not prosecuted, in part because one of the arresting
officers was later killed in an unrelated incident. See id.
310. See id. The officer testified that the case was not prosecuted because the confi-
dential informant was later “kidnapped by some other dopers.” Id.
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deal in cocaine.311 Furthermore, the court held that the prosecution’s
evidence of predisposition had a “prejudicial impact on the mind of
the average juror,” which also warranted a reversal.312
According to the facts presented in Dockery, the defendant was
clearly willing and able to make the transaction on short notice, as
Jackson apparently knew when he took the officer to Dockery’s
house.313 Yet, contrary to its own precedent, the court made no at-
tempt to address the defendant’s “possession of large quantities of
contraband, his ability to access contraband in a short time, his
knowledge of prices and sources and his manner of conducting the
sale of contraband itself.”314 As a consequence, not only was the
prosecution unable to meet its burden of proof in what appears to be
a relatively straightforward case, but it also, in the opinion of the
Indiana Supreme Court, improperly prejudiced the jury in its at-
tempt to do so.315
The Dockery case demonstrates how placing the burden of per-
suasion on the state in a composite hybrid approach leads to a vari-
ety of problems. Too many predisposed and eager defendants will be
acquitted pursuant to unjustified claims of entrapment because the
prosecution will often be unable to meet the dual burden of proving
both predisposition and that the level of police coercion did not affect
the defendant’s free will. One of the attendant problems is that the
prosecution will be forced to present highly prejudicial evidence to
the jury, even though it might not meet the ill-defined “sufficiently
similar” standard, which is applied by the Indiana courts to scruti-
nize evidence of predisposition.316 This, in effect, gives the defendant
two bites at the apple. Either her claim of entrapment succeeds or, if
not, her conviction may be reversed because prejudicial evidence was
presented to the jury.
B.   The Discrete Hybrid Approach
In the hybrid approach used in Florida, North Dakota, and New
Mexico, a defendant is not required to satisfy both the subjective and
objective prongs of the inquiry.317 Rather, each prong is considered to
be an independent justification for establishing a successful entrap-
ment defense.318 According to New Mexico case law, for example, a
                                                                                                                   
311. See id. at 580.
312. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. State, 287 N.E.2d 860, 863 (Ind. 1972)).
313. See id.
314. Gossmeyer v. State, 482 N.E.2d 239, 241 (Ind. 1985).
315. See Dockery, 644 N.E.2d at 580.
316. See, e.g., Powers v. State, 380 N.E.2d 598, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
317. See FLA. STAT. § 777.201 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1997); Baca v.
State, 742 P.2d 1043, 1046 (N.M. 1987).
318. See Paton, supra note 90, at 1005 n.66.
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defendant may prevail “either by showing lack of predisposition to
commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police ex-
ceeded the standards of proper investigation.”319 Similarly, according
to Florida and North Dakota jurisprudence, the burden of persuasion
falls on the defendant, who must satisfy either the subjective or the
objective prong by a preponderance of the evidence.320 This form of
the entrapment defense is termed the “discrete hybrid approach.”
The discrete hybrid inquiry is a relatively recent and little-used
innovation, yet its benefit to defendants is clear. As compared to the
composite hybrid approach used in New Jersey and New Hampshire,
it gives a defendant greater latitude to assert an entrapment defense
while reducing the burden of persuasion. It provides the non-
predisposed defendant with a defense against the government’s
overwhelming power to coerce, and also gives the non-predisposed
defendant a defense against egregious police conduct.
A recent Florida case, Robichaud v. State ,321 illustrates the advan-
tages of the discrete hybrid inquiry. The defendant, Robichaud, took
part in three sales of cocaine, but only after a confidential informant
and undercover agents “threatened [him] with bodily harm, took
away his residence and then, when [he] was jobless and virtually
homeless, offered him a job and a residence on the condition that he
obtain cocaine for them.”322 Although Robichaud was initially found
guilty, the district court reversed his conviction after finding that he
was not predisposed to engage in drug dealing.323 Thus, Robichaud
successfully raised an entrapment defense by meeting the subjective
prong of Florida’s discrete hybrid inquiry.
Suppose, however, that Robichaud’s assertion of non-predisposition
had failed, perhaps because the prosecution presented reputation
                                                                                                                   
319. Baca, 742 P.2d at 1046 (emphasis added).
320. See FLA. STAT. § 777.201(2) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1997); see also
Herrera v. State, 594 So. 2d 275, 278-79 (Fla. 1992) (Kogan, J., concurring); State v. Mur-
chison, 541 N.W.2d 435, 440 (N.D. 1995). The legal source (whether statutory or constitu-
tional) of Florida’s hybrid approach is not entirely clear. In Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90,
98-99 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court indicated that while the subjective prong of
the entrapment inquiry is required by state statute, the objective prong of the inquiry is
founded more in the Due Process Clause of the Florida Constitution.
The North Dakota statute was revised in 1993 and its courts have had little opportunity
to interpret or apply it. However, the North Dakota Legislature modeled its entrapment
statute after Florida’s approach, so it is likely that the courts will apply it similarly. See
Nesheim, supra note 294, at 995.
321. 658 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
322. Id. at 169.
323. See id. The police department had focused its efforts on the defendant after re-
ceiving an anonymous tip that someone in the trailer park in which the defendant lived
was selling narcotics. Although Robichaud admitted to having used cocaine several years
previously, he had no prior felonies, the police had no reason to suspect him of engaging in
criminal activity, and there was nothing to indicate that he had ever had any inclination
to sell drugs. See id.
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evidence suggesting that he had sold drugs in the past. In the federal
courts and in most state courts, where either the subjective or the
composite hybrid approach is favored, his attempt to rely on the de-
fense of entrapment would be unsuccessful. Under Florida’s hybrid
inquiry, however, he would have had a second, and arguably well-
deserved, opportunity to assert the defense on the ground that the
police used egregious tactics when inducing him to commit the crime.
The discrete hybrid approach preserves most of the advantages of
both the objective and subjective standards. As in jurisdictions ap-
plying the subjective standard, defendants who would not commit a
crime on their own initiative are not punished for committing it be-
cause of undue coercion by the government.324 As in jurisdictions
applying the objective standard, predisposed and non-predisposed
defendants are treated equitably under the law, and there is greater
opportunity for the courts to deter police misconduct.325
Nevertheless, the discrete hybrid inquiry presents a few difficul-
ties. Like the subjective approach, it may allow the prosecution to in-
troduce evidence that is highly prejudicial to the defendant.326 In
addition, if the defendant relies on the objective prong, she must still
fulfill the requirements of the abstract and ill-defined “average per-
son” standard.327 Also, from the prosecution’s perspective, the dis-
crete hybrid approach may be overinclusive because it gives defen-
dants, in effect, two separate exculpatory defenses founded on the
entrapment doctrine. However, the most compelling objection to this
approach is that, like the objective standard, it exonerates defen-
dants who were eager to commit the offense simply because the gov-
ernment’s methods of inducement were improper.328
V.   THE OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT DEFENSE: AN EX-
PANSION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
A.   Introduction: The Birth and Nature of the Outrageous
Government Conduct Defense
In 1962, Jack Courtney, a special investigator with the United
States Treasury Department, was told by an informant that two
men, Mike Thomas and John Becker, were attempting to make a
“syndicate” connection so that they could sell bootleg whiskey that
                                                                                                                   
324. See supra text accompanying note 229.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 278-84.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 235-36. However, if appropriate under the cir-
cumstances, the defendant presumably would have the option under the discrete hybrid
approach of limiting his entrapment defense to the objective prong and demanding that
any such prejudicial evidence be excluded.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 285-89.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 290-92.
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they had manufactured.329 Courtney assumed the role of a gangster,
gained the trust of the two men, and eventually bought eight gallons
of whiskey from them.330 Later, following a raid on Thomas’ property
near Sacramento, California, where their still was located, Becker
and Thomas were arrested and sentenced to six months in jail.331
A month after they were released, Becker and Thomas, still un-
aware of Courtney’s true identity, contacted him and asked to re-
sume their illicit dealings.332 Courtney agreed.333 However, as they
had trouble setting up a new still, over the course of the next two-
and-a-half years, Courtney repeatedly contacted the men and offered
to provide them with equipment, a still site in Nevada, an operator,
and plastic containers.334 Although Becker and Thomas did not ac-
cept any of these offers, they did purchase 2000 pounds of sugar from
Courtney at wholesale prices for use in their operation.335 In 1966,
after the defendants had made three new deliveries of bootleg whis-
key to Courtney, he again had them arrested.336
Becker and Thomas were convicted again, but, on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, argued that they had been entrapped as a matter of
law.337 The court of appeals properly found that it was foreclosed
from accepting their entrapment defense since the two were une-
quivocally predisposed to manufacture bootleg whiskey.338 Neverthe-
less, stating that “[w]e do not believe [that] the Government may in-
volve itself so directly and continuously over such a long period of
time in the creation and maintenance of criminal operations, and yet
prosecute its collaborators,” the court reversed their convictions.339
Although the Ninth Circuit never mentioned a statutory or con-
stitutional basis for its holding, the Greene decision is generally re-
garded as the first application of the outrageous government conduct
defense.340 Strictly speaking, a claim of outrageous government con-
duct is not a defense because it results in a dismissal of the criminal
charges regardless of their merits.341 Nevertheless, it is commonly re-
                                                                                                                   
329. See Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir. 1971). Since Earl
Greene, the named defendant, was murdered while this case was under appeal, the facts
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337. See id. at 786.
338. See id.
339. Id. at 787.
340. See, e.g., United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1986)
(discussing Greene).
341. See id. at 1432 n.2.
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ferred to as a defense, so this widely accepted nomenclature will be
used here.
Like the entrapment defenses, a successful claim of outrageous
government conduct exculpates the defendant, even though she may
well have committed all of the elements of the crime.342 Furthermore,
like the objective view of entrapment, the court focuses its inquiry
wholly on the government’s role in the defendant’s behavior and the
propriety of the government’s actions, rather than on the defendant’s
state of mind.343 However, unlike the judicially created entrapment
defenses, the constitutionally grounded outrageous government con-
duct defense has neither been explicitly adopted by the U.S. Su-
preme Court nor universally accepted by lower courts.344 In those ju-
risdictions where it is accepted, the defense has been grounded ei-
ther in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments or in analogous state constitutional provisions.345
Although there are facial similarities between the outrageous
government conduct defense and the objective approach to entrap-
ment, there are also important differences. Most significantly, the
outrageous government conduct defense is narrower in its applica-
tion than the objective entrapment defense. In comparison to the
threshold requirements of a successful objective entrapment defense,
due process jurisprudence demands a significantly higher degree of
governmental misconduct before the outrageous government conduct
defense can be successfully invoked.346 Specifically, the standard for
“outrageousness” is a degree of governmental misconduct that is
“shocking to the universal sense of justice,”347 while a successful ob-
jective entrapment claim merely requires that the government’s
method of inducement was likely to induce an ordinary, reasonable,
law-abiding citizen to break the law.348 The consequence of this dif-
ference is that, unlike claims of objective entrapment, claims of out-
rageous government conduct are rarely successful.349
                                                                                                                   
342. See Gail Greaney, Note, Crossing the Constitutional Line: Due Process and the
Law Enforcement Justification , 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 745, 746 (1992).
343. See, e.g., Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1433 (concluding that an objective legal standard,
without regard to the defendant’s predisposition, is the proper standard for evaluating the
government’s conduct in outrageous government conduct defense cases).
344. See Greaney, supra note 342, at 749-50.
345. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 265. Since it is constitutionally based, a significant
practical difference between the outrageous government conduct defense and the entrap-
ment defense is that the former is an issue of law for the judge, while the latter is an issue
of fact for the jury. See id. at 273-82.
346. See United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1992).
347. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (quoting Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)).
348. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383-84 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).
349. See Mosley, 965 F.2d at 911.
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B.   Constitutional and Precedential Foundations of the Defense
1.   Substantive Due Process and Official Misconduct
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”350
On its face, the Due Process Clause only guarantees procedural pro-
tection; however, the U.S. Supreme Court has also invoked it to pro-
tect certain substantive rights.351 The protection of substantive
rights stems from the Court’s long-held tenet that due process is
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”352 The Court has invoked
substantive due process in cases of egregious deprivations of prop-
erty and liberty, regardless of whether the deprivation is caused by
legislative enactments, administrative actions, or official miscon-
duct.353
In criminal cases, a defendant’s right to due process is violated
when the government has ignored principles of fundamental fair-
ness.354 Unfortunately, there is no well-established dividing line be-
tween fundamentally fair and unfair government behavior.355 Courts
make fundamental fairness determinations on a case-by-case basis,
which means that the substantive due process doctrine with respect
to official misconduct is unclear and difficult to apply.356
The authority of the judiciary to supervise the administration of
the criminal justice system was addressed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in McNabb v. United States .357 In that case, the Court relied on
the “‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice’ which are secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment” to reverse the murder convictions of
three defendants because their post-arrest confessions had been im-
properly coerced.358
The Supreme Court invoked substantive due process to limit po-
lice misconduct again in the case of Rochin v. California .359 In Ro-
chin, police officers entered the defendant’s home based on a suspi-
                                                                                                                   
350. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
351. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has
the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process?, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV.
313, 313 (1991).
352. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
353. See Levinson, supra note 351, at 360.
354. See Kinsella v. United States ex. rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960).
355. See Molly Kathleen Nichols, Comment, Entrapment and Due Process: How Far is
Too Far?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1214-15 (1984).
356. See id.
357. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
358. Id. at 340 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). Following their
arrests for the murder of a federal agent, the three defendants, none of whom had more
than a fourth-grade education, were intensively interrogated for several days. During this
period, they were locked in a bare room for 14 hours, given little to eat, and continuously
interrogated without the benefit of counsel for hours at a time. See id. at 334-39.
359. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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cion that he was selling narcotics.360 They saw two capsules on a ta-
ble in the bedroom, but Rochin swallowed them.361 After unsuccess-
fully attempting to retrieve the capsules from his throat, the police
took the defendant to the hospital and had his stomach pumped.362
The retrieved capsules were used as evidence at his trial and he was
convicted of the possession of an illegal narcotic.363 The district court
of appeal affirmed the conviction and the California Supreme Court
denied Rochin’s petition for a hearing.364
Justice Frankfurter, for a unanimous Court, began his analysis
by observing that the “Due Process Clause inescapably imposes upon
this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the pro-
ceedings . . . to ascertain whether they offend those canons of de-
cency and fairness which express the notions of justice.”365 Regarding
the actions of the police officers, Justice Frankfurter concluded that
illegally breaking into Rochin’s house, forcibly attempting to extract
the pills from his throat, and using an invasive procedure to pump
his stomach shocked the conscience.366 The Court held that such
egregious behavior constituted a deprivation of Rochin’s liberty
without due process and reversed his conviction.367
Although McNabb and Rochin exemplify the Supreme Court’s
past willingness to broaden the applicability of substantive due
process in cases of governmental misconduct, the Court appears to
have reversed that trend in recent years.368 For example, in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services ,369 the
Court rejected a due process claim against a county social services
department for failing to protect a child from his habitually abusive
father, even though the department apparently knew of the danger
to the child.370 The Court concluded that a “[s]tate’s failure to protect
                                                                                                                   




364. See id. at 166-67.
365. Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)).
366. See id. at 172. In frequently quoted language, the Court stated that substantive
due process in criminal cases is violated by government misconduct that “shocks the con-
science” or constitutes a “brutal” use of force that offends “even hardened sensibilities.” Id.
at 172-73.
367. See id. at 174. The Rochin case does not resolve the issue of the outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense because the case focused on the post-arrest conduct of the offi-
cers and it involved a physically intrusive seizure. In contrast, claims of outrageous gov-
ernment conduct, like claims of entrapment, are usually raised in relation to the pre-
arrest behavior of the government actor in inducing the defendant’s criminal behavior.
368. See Levinson, supra note 351, at 360.
369. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
370. See id. at 191-94. After repeatedly abusing the child over a two-year period, the
father eventually beat him so severely that the child suffered brain damage. He was ex-
pected to spend the rest of his life in an institution. See id. at 193.
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an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a
violation of the Due Process Clause.”371 Furthermore, in Whitley v.
Albers372 and Graham v. Connor ,373 the Court held that, when appro-
priate, claims of excessive force by government officials must be
analyzed under the Eighth and Fourth Amendments, respectively,
rather than under the more general due process jurisprudence.374
Thus, there is a solid constitutional and precedential foundation
upon which the Supreme Court could adopt a substantive-due-
process-based affirmative defense for the purpose of policing pre-
arrest official conduct. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the pres-
ent Court would uphold such a defense. Over the past twenty-five
years, however, there have been a few decisions suggesting that at
least some members of the Court believe that the outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense is both constitutional and prudentially
sound.
2.   Supreme Court Precedent Addressing the Defense
In 1969, an undercover federal agent met with Richard Russell
and two others suspected of unlawfully manufacturing metham-
phetamine.375 The agent, who was posing as a member of a criminal
organization, offered to supply the three with a chemical, phenyl-2-
propanone (propanone), in exchange for one-half of the drug pro-
duced.376 The chemical, which is an essential ingredient in the manu-
facture of methamphetamine, is legal but difficult to obtain.377 The
defendants agreed to the arrangement, then gave the agent a sample
of the drug that they had manufactured previously.378 Two days
later, the agent gave the defendants propanone and watched them
manufacture more of the drug in their laboratory.379 After the defen-
dants were arrested, an entrapment instruction was given at trial,
but they were convicted nonetheless.380
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction because the
undercover agent had supplied the necessary chemical, which the
court argued was an “intolerable degree of governmental participa-
tion in the criminal enterprise.”381 The Supreme Court, however, re-
                                                                                                                   
371. Id. at 197.
372. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
373. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
374. See id. at 397-99; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327-28; see also Levinson, supra note 351,
at 345.




379. See id. at 426.
380. See id. at 424.
381. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972).
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jected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and reinstated the conviction.382
Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist, for the majority, reasoned
that the entrapment defense was “not intended to give the federal
judiciary a ‘chancellor’s foot’ veto over law enforcement practices of
which it did not approve.”383 Interestingly, however, Justice
Rehnquist also stated that “[w]hile we may some day be presented
with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the gov-
ernment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, the
instant case is distinctly not of that breed.”384 This “some day” dicta,
as the passage has come to be known, has been so widely cited in
connection with the outrageous government conduct defense that it
has effectively become a battle cry for the defense’s proponents.385
Justice Rehnquist’s seemingly contradictory statements in Rus-
sell created confusion among the lower courts. For example, while
most courts of appeals continued to recognize only the subjective en-
trapment defense, the Second Circuit interpreted the “some day”
dicta as creating a supplemental due process defense that empow-
ered courts to regulate the conduct of police and other officials.386
Perhaps as a consequence, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
another official conduct-related case, Hampton v. United States ,387
less than three years later.
Hampton was convicted of selling heroin to undercover DEA
agents, even though a government informant allegedly supplied the
heroin to him.388 The defendant admitted that he was predisposed to
commit the crime but, relying on the Russell “some day” dicta, he ar-
gued that the government’s actions in both supplying him with the
heroin and purchasing it were so outrageous that it violated his right
to due process.389 The Court affirmed Hampton’s conviction and, in
the process, merely increased confusion in the lower courts.390
Justice Rehnquist wrote a three-justice plurality opinion in
Hampton. In striking contrast to his dicta in Russell, Justice
Rehnquist attempted to foreclose the use of the outrageous govern-
ment conduct defense by opining that due process protections “come
into play only when the Government activity in question violates
some [constitutionally] protected right of the Defendant.”391 However,
                                                                                                                   
382. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 425.
383. Id. at 435.
384. Id. at 431-32 (citation omitted).
385. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 415-16.
386. See United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1973).
387. 425 U.S. 484 (1976); see also supra notes 63-73 (discussing Hampton).
388. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 485-87.
389. See id. at 489-90.
390. See id. at 491.
391. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
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both of the concurring justices392 and the three dissenting justices393
opined that the outrageous government conduct defense is a valid
exercise of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process
Clauses. As a result, Justice Rehnquist’s attempt to repudiate his
Russell “some day” dicta effectively failed, leaving the lower courts
free to form their own opinions of the defense.
C.   Lower Court Adoption of the Outrageous Government Conduct
Defense: Competing Perspectives
1.   The Prevailing Perspective: The Defense Is a Valid Exercise of
Substantive Due Process
Five different federal courts of appeals have expressly accepted
the constitutional validity of the outrageous government conduct de-
fense, although only the Third and Ninth Circuits have actually in-
voked it to dismiss an indictment.394 These five courts of appeals,
which also include the First,395 Seventh,396 and Tenth Circuits,397
have grounded the defense in substantive due process, although the
judiciary’s “supervisory powers” are a possible alternative founda-
tion.398
The two seminal outrageous government conduct cases are United
States v. Twigg399 and United States v. Bogart .400 In Twigg, a gov-
ernment agent named Kubica suggested to the two defendants that
they all start an illegal methamphetamine manufacturing opera-
                                                                                                                   
392. See id. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell was joined by Justice
Blackmun in arguing that, while the outrageous government conduct defense remains
valid, it simply did not apply in Hampton’s case. See id. at 491-95.
393. See id. at 495. The three dissenters—Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall—
agreed with the concurrence that the outrageous government conduct defense is constitu-
tionally valid, but argued that Hampton’s conviction should be reversed. See id. at 496-
500.
394. See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1440 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 1978); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744, 752-53 (N.D. Cal.
1981).
395. See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 8 n.11 (1st Cir. 1993).
396. See United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1989).
397. See United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1992). In addition, dicta
from the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals suggests
that each has accepted the viability of the defense, although none have ever invoked it.
See United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev’d on other
grounds, 503 U.S. 540 (1992); United States v. Arteaga, 807 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Capo,
693 F.2d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir.), modified on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Lis-
enby, 716 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir.
1982).
398. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 861; Nichols, supra note 355, at 1216-17.
399. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
400. 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986).
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tion.401 Once the defendants agreed, Kubica located a site, supplied
equipment and chemicals, and directed the manufacturing process.402
After the drugs were produced, federal agents then arrested the de-
fendants, and they were subsequently convicted in the district
court.403 On appeal, the Third Circuit summarized the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Russell and Hampton, then reversed the defen-
dant’s convictions on the ground that “[f]undamental fairness does
not permit us to countenance such actions by law enforcement offi-
cials and prosecution for a crime so fomented by them will be
barred.”404
In Bogart, the defendant was the subject of a joint investigation
by California and Utah authorities regarding his alleged involve-
ment in a fraudulent real estate scheme.405 In addition, he was in-
volved in a legitimate business relationship with a partner, Ralph
LaQuay, for the purpose of selling posters in California.406 Over the
course of five months, authorities in Utah arrested Bogart on four
occasions on charges of questionable merit.407 Because he was unable
to post bail, Bogart spent the entire time in jail.408 Soon after
Bogart’s first arrest, a San Francisco police officer named Kathleen
Thaxton convinced LaQuay to become an informant.409 LaQuay, fol-
lowing Thaxton’s instructions, then falsely told Bogart that he could
not afford to pay their poster supplier because he had invested his
money in a quantity of cocaine.410 During the series of phone calls
that followed, Bogart repeatedly expressed his need for the poster
money to post bail, yet also indicated an unwillingness to become in-
volved in a narcotics sale.411 He eventually acquiesced and agreed to
trade the cocaine for 3500 posters.412 Both Bogart and the poster
supplier were later arrested for conspiring to deal in narcotics.413
                                                                                                                   
401. See Twigg, 588 F.2d at 375-76.
402. See id.
403. See id. at 376. The jury found that one of the defendants, Neville, was predis-
posed to commit the crime, apparently because he had expressed no reluctance or hesita-
tion at the time of the inducement. The Third Circuit found that this was a sufficient basis
for a jury finding of predisposition, which prevented Neville from successfully invoking
the entrapment defense. Similarly, the entrapment defense was not available to the sec-
ond defendant, Twigg, because he was induced to enter into the criminal enterprise by
Neville, rather than by a government agent. See id.
404. Id. at 381.
405. See Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1429.
406. See id. at 1429-30.
407. See id. at 1430.
408. See id. Bail varied from $50,000 to $400,000 at different times depending on the
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At trial, Bogart was prevented from successfully raising a defense
of entrapment because of his criminal background, which suggested
that he was predisposed.414 Instead, Bogart moved for dismissal on
the ground that the government’s conduct was so outrageous that it
violated his right to due process.415 The court denied the motion and,
even though the judge conceded that he did not approve of the gov-
ernment’s conduct, Bogart was convicted.416 While considering
Bogart’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit carefully outlined the applicabil-
ity of the outrageous government conduct defense, conceding that
“[t]he point of division at the margins between police conduct that is
just acceptable and that which goes a fraction too far probably can-
not be usefully defined in the abstract.”417 Nevertheless, the court re-
affirmed the viability of the defense and remanded the case for ad-
ditional factual inquiry into possible violations of Bogart’s due proc-
ess rights.418
As suggested by the Ninth Circuit in Bogart, the scope and appli-
cability of the outrageous government conduct defense is unclear in
ambiguous situations.419 Because there is little precedent upon which
they may base their decisions, courts accepting the constitutional
validity of the defense necessarily make determinations of outra-
geousness on a case-by-case basis.
The Florida Supreme Court, for example, has recently applied an
unusually broad interpretation of outrageousness and a liberal ap-
plication of the defense.420 The court may invoke the defense to re-
verse defendants’ convictions when law enforcement violates crimi-
nal law during the course of making a case against the defendant.421
The court overturned a defendant’s conviction for purchasing crack
cocaine because the Broward County Sheriff’s Office manufactured
the crack in its own laboratory rather than using previously confis-
cated crack.422 Although the source of the drug had no bearing on the
defendant’s criminal activities, the court concluded that due process
                                                                                                                   
414. See id. at 1431. In fact, the judge even remarked that, if not for Bogart’s back-




417. Id. at 1438.
418. See id.
419. See id. It is probable that, by the very nature of the defense, its scope and appli-
cability are destined to remain ill-defined. As Justice Frankfurter noted: “In dealing not
with the machinery of government but with human rights, the absence of formal exacti-
tude, or want of fixity of meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of con-
stitutional provisions. Words being symbols do not speak without a gloss.” Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
420. See State v. Williams, 623 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 1993).
421. See id.
422. See id.
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provides a “defense to overturn criminal convictions as a check
against outrageous police conduct.”423
The Florida approach notwithstanding, it is clear from the rapidly
growing amount of dicta concerning the defense that there are two
situations in which courts are likely to find that a criminal defen-
dant’s due process rights have been violated by pre-arrest govern-
mental conduct.424 The first situation is when the government essen-
tially generates a crime for the purpose of obtaining a conviction,
rather than merely infiltrating an existing criminal enterprise.425
Such a circumstance is exemplified by Twigg, in which the court
found a due process violation because the government agent created
the drug manufacturing scheme, supplied necessary materials, and
directed the manufacturing process solely for the purpose of arrest-
ing the other participants.426 Although under this doctrine the gov-
ernment may not engineer and direct the criminal enterprise from
start to finish,427 it is not a due process violation for the government
to induce a defendant to repeat, continue, or expand previous crimi-
nal behavior.428
The second situation in which courts are likely to find a due proc-
ess violation is when the government uses excessive coercion to in-
duce a person into committing a crime.429 This is perhaps best ex-
emplified by Bogart, in which the defendant asserted that he was co-
erced into participating in a drug transaction in order to gain his
freedom from a wrongful and pretextual incarceration.430 The Ninth
Circuit held that those facts, if proven, would constitute outrageous
government conduct in violation of the Due Process Clause.431 Most
courts have indicated that the government’s coercion must be par-
ticularly egregious, as it apparently was in Bogart, before they will
find that the defendant’s due process rights have been violated.432
However, a few courts have been more liberal in their approach. In
United States v. Batres-Santolino ,433 for example, the court indicated
that a mere financial inducement by the government, if large
enough, could be sufficiently egregious to violate due process.434
                                                                                                                   
423. Id. at 465. Notably, the Florida Supreme Court based its decision in the Due
Process Clause of the Florida Constitution, rather than in the U.S. Constitution. See id.
424. See United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 911-12 (10th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1425, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986).
425. See Mosley, 965 F.2d at 911.
426. See supra notes 401-404 and accompanying text (summarizing Twigg).
427. See United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983).
428. See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1468-69 (10th Cir. 1986).
429. See Mosley, 965 F.2d at 912.
430. See supra notes 405-18 and accompanying text (summarizing Bogart).
431. See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1425, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986).
432. See id.
433. 521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
434. See id. at 749.
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In summary, most courts appear to have concluded that the out-
rageous government conduct defense is a valid and necessary exer-
cise of substantive due process protection. Although the scope of the
defense remains poorly delineated, general guidelines are emerging
and, as a consequence, defendants are raising it with increasing fre-
quency.
2.   The Minority View: The Defense Is Unconstitutional
In contrast to the majority of the courts of appeals and a number
of states, the judges of the Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals have explicitly rejected both the constitutionality and the mer-
its of the outrageous government conduct defense.435 These judges
have presented a variety of arguments to support their position.
One of the more compelling of these arguments is that substan-
tive due process protections should apply only when the government
has violated a defendant’s specifically enumerated constitutional
right.436 In essence, the contention is that a reversal of a conviction
should rest only on a violation of a personal right guaranteed by the
Constitution, rather than on a right that has been invented for the
occasion.437 Supreme Court case law supports this argument. Most
significantly, in United States v. Payner ,438 justices concluded that
evidence that cannot be excluded under Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence cannot, in the alternative, be excluded on grounds of due
process.439 The majority opinion quoted, with approval, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s previous assertion in Hampton that the limitations of
the Due Process Clause come into play only when governmental ac-
tivity violates some constitutionally protected right of the defen-
dant.440
                                                                                                                   
435. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1426 (6th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1271-73 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
436. See Miller, 891 F.2d at 1271.
437. See id.
438. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
439. See id. at 731. In Payner, government investigators hired a woman to befriend a
bank’s courier. When the courier left his briefcase at the woman’s apartment, the investi-
gators searched it. Subsequently, they used incriminating documents found in the brief-
case to prosecute some of the bank’s customers. The defendants were prevented from
challenging the search on Fourth Amendment grounds because they had no privacy inter-
est in the briefcase, but they argued that the use of the evidence should be suppressed
nevertheless under the Due Process Clause and the judiciary’s supervisory powers. See id.
at 730-31.
440. See id. at 737 n.9 (quoting Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976)).
Of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s position contradicts the Court’s earlier decisions in
Rochin and McNabb, in which it concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes independent limitations on governmental conduct. See supra notes
357-67 and accompanying text. However, the precedential value of Rochin is debatable,
since it is possible that the Court decided it on due process grounds only because the
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A related due-process-based argument against the outrageous
government conduct defense was presented by Judge Suhrheinrich
in United States v. Tucker .441 In effect, Judge Suhrheinrich reviewed
the Supreme Court’s treatment of the entrapment defense and con-
cluded that governmental inducement could never be a due process
violation.442 Based on the fact that the Supreme Court chose to
ground the subjective entrapment approach in legislative intent
rather than in the Constitution, he concluded that “[i]f due process is
not offended by convicting those who are not predisposed, a priori it
is not offended by convicting those who are predisposed.”443
A third argument against the adoption of the outrageous govern-
ment conduct defense is that it violates the separation of powers doc-
trine.444 According to this argument, the judiciary should not be able
to apply a “chancellor’s foot veto” over executive conduct of which it
disapproves because the management of executive conduct is appro-
priately left to the legislature.445 Furthermore, because Congress has
already “implicitly curbed the Executive Branch by intending, as an
implied part of each criminal statute, that no conviction may be had
against one who was induced by the government to commit a crime
unless the government proves . . . that [she] was predisposed,” the
issue with regard to the federal courts is arguably settled.446 Specifi-
cally, federal courts are arguably precluded from applying substan-
tive due process principles to exculpate an induced defendant be-
cause the legislative intent is clear—the gravamen of a proper judi-
cial inquiry is the defendant’s subjective predisposition and nothing
more.447
The final argument against the adoption of the outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense is that it creates problems of consistency in
the courts.448 According to this argument, there can be no uniform
application of the defense because it is not possible to formulate a
precise definition of outrageousness.449 As a consequence, judges
                                                                                                                   
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule had not yet been incorporated and applied to the
states. See Dripps, supra note 23, at 267.
441. 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994).
442. See id. at 1427.
443. Id.
444. See id. at 1428.
445. See United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1271 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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would simply “vote their lower intestines,” which is an inappropriate
means of applying the Due Process Clause.450
VI.   CONCLUSION: MOVING TOWARD A DUAL SYSTEM OF DEFENSES
To protect society and obtain evidence against unwary criminals,
government agents must engage in undercover activities and in-
ducement. However, starting with the Sorrells opinion, the Supreme
Court has consistently recognized that this need to use “[a]rtifice and
stratagem” must be offset by a means for protecting unwary inno-
cents from being lured into criminal behavior by the government’s
actions.451
A majority of the Court has always held the view that the subjec-
tive approach to entrapment, by itself, provides an adequate coun-
terbalance to the government’s overwhelming power and ability to
entice.452 By rejecting the objective approach to entrapment, it has
also implicitly adopted the position that there is little need for the
judicial branch to directly police the enforcement activities of the ex-
ecutive branch.453
Despite the Supreme Court’s view, most jurisdictions in the
United States are operating under a dual system of defenses in
which the subjective approach to entrapment is augmented by the
outrageous government conduct defense.454 This dual system gives
the judicial branch the means by which it can both protect unwary
innocents455 and prevent the executive branch’s efforts at undercover
investigation and inducement from becoming truly reprehensible.456
Although the doctrinal foundation of the outrageous government
conduct defense differs from that of the entrapment defenses, a pri-
mary purpose of each is to prevent government officials from playing
a causal role in criminal or other reprehensible behavior. The sub-
jective approach to entrapment accomplishes this through an exami-
nation of the initial willingness of an induced defendant. The objec-
tive approach to entrapment and the outrageous government con-
duct defense each accomplish this by allowing courts to scrutinize
the government’s actions directly.
In practical application, the subjective approach is the least reli-
able of the three defenses because a factual inquiry into a defen-
dant’s thought processes is unavoidably inaccurate. The consequence
is that the subjective approach is underinclusive—defendants may
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be convicted even when the government’s actions almost certainly
caused the crime. In contrast, a factual and objective inquiry into the
government’s actions is far less complex and more accurate. How-
ever, even the most simplistic objective inquiry is subject to misap-
plication because it is often difficult for courts to accurately distin-
guish between government actions that are outrageous, government
actions that would induce criminal behavior, and government ac-
tions that merely constitute artifice and strategem.
The most effective means for minimizing the government’s in-
volvement in crime and achieving fair verdicts, then, is for courts to
retain the flexibility to conduct a dual subjective/objective inquiry.
Under such a dual inquiry, the judge or jury first engages in an ob-
jective examination into whether the government’s actions were ei-
ther outrageous or would cause an otherwise innocent person to en-
gage in the crime charged, depending on the applicable law of the
jurisdiction. If this inquiry fails, the jury can then proceed with a
subjective inquiry to determine whether the defendant was an un-
wary innocent induced into committing a crime by the government.
In addition to compensating for the underinclusiveness of the sub-
jective approach, using an objective approach as a backstop allows
courts to provide explicit guidance to police agencies concerning the
appropriateness of their actions in undercover operations.
